The main legal point established in the judgment is the principle of lex non cogit ad impossibilia, which states that the law does not compel a person to do that which they cannot possibly perform. This principle influenced the court's decision regarding the timeliness of the filing of the suit.

1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Subordinate Court of Quilon in O. S. No. 130 of 1957. The appellant the Madura Company Private Limited, agents of the British India Steam Navigation Company Limited was the 2nd defendant in that suit.

2. The plaintiff the 1st respondent before us sought damages for the short delivery of 354 bags of cashew nuts out of a shipment of 4500 bags from Inhambane to Cochin with transhipment at Lourenco-Marques. The bill of lading concerned is Ext. D. 5. Clause.16 of the 24 clauses printed in the bill of lading reads as follows:

"Law applicable. The contract evidenced by this Bill of Lading shall be governed by the Laws of England and in accepting this Bill of Lading the shippers and consignees expressly accept and agree to all its stipulations, exceptions and conditions whether written, stamped or printed as fully as if signed by him or them."

3. The English Law relating to bills of lading is embodied in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924. The third paragraph of R.6 of Art. III in that Act corresponding to the third paragraph of R.6 of Art. III in the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 provides that "in any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered."

4. The suit was originally instituted as O. S. No 59 of 1956 in the District Court of Quilon on 28 51956. It was subsequently transferred to the Subordinate Court of Quilon and renumbered as O. S. No. 130 of 1957. It is common ground that the period of one year within which the suit should have been instituted expired during the summer recess and that the suit was as a matter of fact instituted on the date on which the District Court of Quilon reopened after the said recess.

5. S.4 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, provides that, "where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the Court re-opens," and S.10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897:

"Where, by any Central Act or Regulation nude after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open."

It is not disputed that neither of the sections will in terms apply as the period of one year with which we are concerned is not a period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, or any other enactment of this country but is only a contractual term introduced by reference to a provision of the (English) Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924.

6. The only question, therefore, is whether the principle embodied in those sections can salvage the plaint in this case. That principle is summed up in the maxims: lex non cogit ad impossibilia and actus curiae neminem gravabit. The former maxim says that the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform; and the latter that an act of the court shall prejudice no man.

7. We have come to the conclusion that the principle above-mentioned a rule of "elementary justice" as stated in Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande AIR. 1942 Allahabad 429 will sustain the contention of the 1st respondent that the plaint he filed on 28 51956 was a plaint filed within time. Mayor v. Harding L. R.2 Q. B. 410 is a case in point. In that case the appellant had applied to justices to state a case under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857. He received the case from them on Good Friday, and transmitted it to the proper court on the following Wednesday. It was held th