The main legal point established in the judgment is that the failure of office bearers of a co-operative society to fulfill their prescribed duties constitutes breach of trust under S.49 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, VI of 1932.

1. These revision petitions and appeals arise out of four original petitions filed in the District Court of South Malabar which were disposed of by a common judgment by the District Judge of Kozhikode. The original petitions were by office bearers of Thazhekode Producers-cum-Consumers Co-operative Society who prayed for setting aside surcharge orders passed against them by the Register of Co-operative Societies, South Malabar, under S.49 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, VI of 1932. The learned District Judge declined to set aside the orders and the petitioners have preferred these civil revision petitions and appeals from the order of the District Judge. C.R.P. No. 166 of 1959 is by one Unnimoyan, the petitioner in O.P. No. 40 of 1952, who was the President of the Society from its inception till he resigned his office on 24-5-1947. A.S. No. 30 of 1959 is by one Appu, the petitioner in O.P. No. 45 of 1952, who was elected as President on the resignation of the former President. Achuthan, who was the Vice President throughout, was the petitioner in O.P. No. 43 of 1952 and he has preferred A.S. No. 82 of 1959 and CRP. No. 80 of 1959 against the order of the District Judge. The petitioner in CRP. No. 96 of 1959 is one Sivasankaran, the petitioner in O.P. No. 57 of 1952, who was the secretary of the Society from 12-4-1947 to 10-12-1947. The civil revision petitions and appeals were heard together.

2. The learned Government pleader who appeared for the second respondent, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, raised a preliminary objection that the appeals were incompetent as Act VI of 1932 does not provide for an appeal from the decision of District Judge and as the decision of the District Judge is neither a decree nor an appealable order. He also contended for the extreme position that even a revision petition is not maintainable against the order. The submission of counsel for the petitioners and the appellants is that when once the matter reaches the civil court and a decision is given, the same will be subject to appeal. Reliance was placed in support of this position on the decision of the Privy Council in Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara (AIR. 1948 P.C.12) and of the Madras High Court in Sundaram Iyer v. Dy. Registrar, Co-op. Societies (AIR. 1957 Mad. 634). In the former case the question arose whether an order passed under S.20,19 and 8 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938, and S.151 and 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as another order passed on a petition for amendment of the decree in accordance with S.19 of Act IV of 1938 were appealable. It was held that both the orders were appealable, the former as a decree in a suit and the latter as one passed in execution of the decree. Lord Simonds, who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed:

"The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal."

This observation must be understood in the context, and I venture to think that this does not mean that there is a right of appeal in every matter decided by a civil court. The proceeding before the District Judge was not a suit and the order does not fall within the definition of a decree in the Code of Civil Procedure. The question of appealability of on order of the District Judge under S.49 of Act VI of 1932 (Madras) did not arise in the latter case. Their Lordships were only disposing of a writ petition to prohibit the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies from proceeding with certain plaints filed under S.51 of Act VI of 1932 (Madras). My attention was also drawn to a decision of this court reported in 1959 KLT. 334. That was an appeal from an order dismissing a pet