The application under S.8 of Act XXXI of 1958 should be treated as a suit, and the Articles of the Limitation Act applying to suits should be applied to this proceeding. The defences available to the debtor, including the plea of limitation, should be considered in such proceedings.

1. The facts that led to the Civil Revision Petition may be briefly stated. The respondent executed a promissory note on 10th November 1955 in favour of the petitioner. No amount was paid towards the debt; and ultimately on 7th July 1959 the petitioner filed A.R.P. No. 31 of 1959 before the primary court under S.4 and 8 of Kerala Act XXXI of 1958, for fixing the instalments payable under the Act and for an executable order for the recovery of such instalments. The respondent-debtor claimed that the debt was barred by limitation, which was accepted by both the lower courts. The petitioner creditor questions in revision the legality of that order. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer on behalf of the petitioner contends firstly, that there is no provision in the Limitation Act which applies to an application under S.8 of Act XXXI of 1958, and secondly, that even if a suit on the promissory note is barred, it is only the remedy by way of suit that is barred and not the right, and if the right can be enforced in any other manner the law does not prohibit the same.

2. The Act does not appear to prohibit generally the application of the law of limitation under the Indian Limitation Act to proceedings under the Act. In some cases, for example Secs. 21 and 22, some variations are made. It will be interesting to note in this connection S.3 of the Act. Subsection 1 of S.3 enacts that no application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt shall be made against any agriculturist in any court before the expiry of six months from the commencement of the Act. Sub-s. 2 of the same section provides that where a creditor files a suit for recovery of a debt before the expiry of six months from the commencement of the Act or after the agriculturist has paid or deposited the sums and instalments specified in S.4 and during the period when he is so entitled to pay, the court shall in decreeing the suit direct the plaintiff to bear his own costs and to pay the costs of the defendant who is an agriculturist, except in cases where the claim would have been barred by limitation had no such suit been filed or when a debt is jointly due from an agriculturist and a non-agriculturist. This section provides sufficient indication to gather the intention of the legislature. Sub-section 1 bars only applications for execution of decrees. Regarding suits there is no such bar under sub-section 2. As a matter of fact sub-section 2 contemplates the filing of suits. The only restriction is that if suits are filed before the expiry of six months from the commencement of the Act or after the agriculturist has paid or deposited the sums and instalments specified in S.4 and during the period when he is so entitled to pay, then the court shall in decreeing the suit direct the plaintiff to bear his own costs and to pay the costs of the defendant. Even for this there is an exception provided and that is in cases where the claim would have been barred by limitation had no such suit been filed or when a debt is jointly due from an agriculturist and a non-agriculturist. This exception makes the position clear beyond doubt that in a case where the claim would have been barred had no suit been filed and if a suit be filed in such a case, the powers of the court are not in any way restricted to grant a decree with costs.

3. But the first contention of Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer is that there is no provision in the Limitation Act for such applications as contemplated by S.8 of Act XXXI of 1958 and therefore, according to him, for an application under S.8 there is no limitation at all. For this the answer on the side of the respondent is that the application under S.8 is in effect a suit and the order passed in such proceeding is an executable decree of a Civil Court. The respondent's learned advocate invites my attention to the several provisions of S.8 dealing with the payment of court fee, the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the executability of t