The court emphasized the importance of compliance with statutory terms to establish jurisdiction and the duty of the District Court to ensure the validity of a reference made under the Act.

1. The plaintiff in L A.R. No. 48 of 1957 of the District Court of Quilon is the petitioner before us. The award concerned was made on 14-2-1953.

2. The reference was dismissed by the District Judge on the ground that it was made after the expiry of the period of two months prescribed by proviso (b) to sub-section (2) of S.18 of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act, 1089. The question for determination is whether he had the jurisdiction to do so.

3. The period prescribed in proviso (b) to sub-section (2) of S.18 of the (Indian) Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is six weeks, and not two months as provided in proviso (b) to sub-section (2) of S.18 of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act, 1089. There are some other differences also in the wording of the two sections; but as far as the question of jurisdiction arising before us is concerned, they can be considered as identical.

4. The petition for reference itself discloses, quite clearly, that it was filed beyond the period prescribed. It states that the notice was received by the petitioner on 15-4-1953. The petition for reference is dated 13-7-1953 and was filed on the next day, on 14-7-1953.

5. The petition appears to have been submitted to the Collector only over four years after the date of its presentation. The office note is dated 25-7-1957 and reads as follows:

"The applicant is the defendant in this case. The application is in time. The case may be forwarded to the concerned court for reference. For orders."

The Collector ordered on the same date: "Yes". The office note and the order thereon are in explicable except on the basis of carelessness or corruption.

6. S.18 of the (Indian) Land Acquisition Act, 1894, reads as follows:

"(1). Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

"(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made:

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under S.12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award whichever period shall first expire."

In I.L.R. 30 Bombay 275 Chandravarkar, J., held that the conditions prescribed by S.18 of the Act are the conditions to which the power of the Collector to make a reference is subject, and that those conditions must be fulfilled before the court can have jurisdiction to entertain a reference. The same view was expressed by Beaumont, C.J. in A.I.R. 1944 Bombay 200:

"The Collector has power to make a reference on certain specified conditions. The first condition is that there shall be a written application by a person interested who has not accepted the award, the second condition is as to the nature of the objections which may be taken, and the third condition is as to the time within which the application shall be made. It seems to me that the Court is bound to satisfy itself that the reference made by the Collector complies with the specified conditions, so as to give the Court jurisdiction to hear the reference. It is not a question of the Court sitting in appeal or revision on the decision of the Collector; it is a question of the Court satisfying itself that the reference made under the Act is one which it is required to hear. If the reference does not comply with the terms of the Act, then the Court cannot entertain it."

7. The current view of the Madras High Court is the same. In I.L.R. 1955 Madras 1062 Govinda Menon, J., after a review of the divergence of