The Act was upheld in respect of certain tenures such as Jenmom lands, Inam lands, Kandukrishi lands, and lands assigned by the Government, while it was struck down in respect of other tenures.

1. The petitioners in these writ petitions challenge the validity of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, IV of 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) mainly on the following grounds:

(i) The Bill which became the Act had lapsed before it was assented to by the President and the Assent of the President was of no avail to turn it into law.

(ii) The Act violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Art.14,19 and 31 of the Constitution.

(iii) The properties of the petitioners are not Estates within the meaning of the expression in Art.31A of the Constitution.

(iv) The manner in which ceiling is fixed results in discrimination.

(v) Compensation payable is quite illusory and results in discrimination.

(vi) The classification of land for the purposes of the Act as well as the exemption of certain types of plantations is discriminatory.

2. The broad ground on which the petitions are opposed by the respondent, the State of Kerala, is that the lands in question fall within the definition of "estate" in Art.31A and that the legislation is therefore constitutional.

3. We may observe at the outset that in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala 1962 KLT. (S.C.) 1 and Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala 1962 KLT. (S.C.) 42 which cover all the grounds enumerated above except the third, arguments were addressed only on the question whether the lands held under the different tenures referred to in the petitions can be treated as "estates" as defined in Art.31A of the Constitution. This question has to be answered in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the two decisions cited above.

4. The lands claimed by the petitioners are mostly situate in the former State of Travancore which now forms part of the State of Kerala and are held by the petitioners under different tenures. As the Supreme Court has held that certain provisions of the Act are violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, it is sufficient to consider whether the petitioners' lands are within the definition of "estate." If the petitioners have full proprietary rights in the soil, the petitioners must fail. We may also state that in respect of certain of the tenures which come under the bread head of Janmam rights, the validity of the Act will have to be upheld even if it offends Art.14,19 and 31.

5. Soon after the Supreme Court delivered judgments in Purushothaman Nambudiri's case and Kunhikoman's case, the petitioners filed supplementary affidavits stating the various tenures under which they held lands. These fall under the following heads:

(i) Pandaravaka lands-: (i) Pandarapattom. (ii) Pandaravaka Otti

(ii) Jenmom lands:-

(1) Thanathu (2) Thettom (3) Mana Vaka (4) Brahmaswom Vaka or Devaswom Vaka (5) Kudijenmom (6) Kanom (7) Kanom Kudi Jenmom (8) Venpattom.

(iii) Inam:

(1) Adima (2) Anubhogam (3) Thiruvulam (4) Danom (.5) Pandaravaka Kudi Jenmom (6) Erayeli (7) Viruthi (8) Karam Ozhivu.

(iv) Kandukrishi Lands

(v) Sri Pandaravaka Lands and

(vi) Thiruppuvarom.

Besides these, there are three, viz., Puravaka, Pandaravaka Verumpattom and Pandaravaka Kanom Lands, of the former State of Cochin which are claimed by the petitioner in O.P. No. 862 of 1961. As agreed to by counsel, these will be dealt with separately and the question is left open for the present.

6. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that if the word "estate" is defined in an existing law relating to land tenures in force in a particular area, no difficulty will arise. There was no law in the former State of Travancore defining the term "estate". Reference was made to Estates Rent Recovery Act, IV of 1068, which was an Act "authorising the continuance of the existing practice in regard to recovery of rents due to the Estates of Kilimannoor and Edapalli. There is no definition of the term "estate" in this Act, and there was no necessity for defining it as it related exclusively to collection of re