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1962 Supreme(Ker) 170

Judges : K.K.MATHEW
Chacko - Appellant
Versus
Varkey - Respondent
Case No : C. R. P. No. 383 of 1962
Decided On : 07/30/1962
Advocates Appeared :
K. V. Kuriakose; For Petitioner K. P. Abraham; K. K. Poulose; Paul V. Kunnil; For Respondent

A defendant could claim the benefit of Act IV of 1961 and disregard any decree passed in the case if they could establish their status as a tenant under the Act, even if there was a preliminary decree settling the relationship as mortgagor and mortgagee.

Headnote:

Additional Written Statement - Jurisdiction of Court - The court allowed the defendant to file an additional written statement raising the contention of being a tenant under Act IV of 1961, despite the existence of a preliminary decree settling the relationship as mortgagor and mortgagee. The court held that the defendant could claim the benefit of the Act and disregard any decree passed in the case if they could establish their status as a tenant under the Act.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff filed a Civil Revision Petition against the lower court's order accepting an additional written statement filed by the defendant, who raised the contention of being a tenant under Act IV of 1961, despite the existence of a preliminary decree settling the relationship as mortgagor and mortgagee.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the defendant could claim the benefit of Act IV of 1961 and disregard any decree passed in the case if they could establish their status as a tenant under the Act. The court also found that the lower court had the discretion to accept an additional written statement at that stage, and no question of jurisdiction was involved.

Issues: The issues involved the jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain an additional written statement at that stage, and the defendant's contention of being a tenant under Act IV of 1961 despite the existence of a preliminary decree settling the relationship as mortgagor and mortgagee.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the defendant could claim the benefit of Act IV of 1961 and disregard any decree passed in the case if they could establish their status as a tenant under the Act. The court also found that the lower court had the discretion to accept an additional written statement at that stage.

Final Decision: The Civil Revision Petition was dismissed by the court, and no costs were awarded.

Judgment :-

1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the plaintiff against an order of the lower court accepting an additional written statement filed by the defendant in the case. The facts briefly are: - a preliminary decree for redemption has been passed in O.S. No. 354121, and thereafter, the lower court passed a final decree on 13-11-1954, but the 1st defendant and the plaintiff filed appeals and second appeals against that decree and this court set aside the final decree, and remanded the case for a re-fixation of the compensation due to the defendant under Act 29 of 1958. That was on the 27th July 1961. On 3-1-1962 when the matter was pending consideration by the lower court the 1st defendant put in an additional written statement and a petition for receiving it as part of the pleading. In that written statement, he raised the contention that he is a tenant coming within the purview of Act IV of 1961, and prayed that the suit may be dismissed on the ground that he is entitled to fixity of tenure. The lower court passed an order allowing the prayer of the 1st defendant for receiving the written statement as part of the pleadings. It is against this order that the plaintiff has come in revision.

2. It was argued by counsel for the petitioner, that the lower court had no jurisdiction to entertain an additional written statement at that stage, and that the jurisdiction of that court was limited to the matters specified in the order of remand. That, when a court remands a case, the jurisdiction of the court to which it is remanded is limited by the order of remand, and that it cannot take into consideration matters other than those specified in the order of remand, is clear from the following rulings. C.N. Ambrose v. Meenakshi (1953 TC.109), M.L. Das & Sons v. Sampatmull (1954 Calcutta 103) and Sunder Ahir v. Phuljharia (1957 Patna 534). Therefore, counsel contended, that the order of the court accepting the written statement was without jurisdiction, and therefore, I must invoke my jurisdiction under S.115 off the Civil Procedure Code. I am not impressed by the argument. S.6 of Act IV of 1961 is clear that if the defendant can establish that he is a tenant coming within the purview of the Act he is entitled to disregard any decree that; may be passed in the case. In this case even though the preliminary decree has been passed based on the relationship of the mortgagor and the mortgagee, it is open to the defendant to show that he is a tenant coming within the purview of the Act and claim the benefit of fixity of tenure. Even if a final decree has been passed, it is open to a defendant to put forward the contention that he is a tenant within the purview of the Act. I am therefore of opinion that even though there is a preliminary decree settling the relationship of the parties as a mortgagor and mortgagee, it is open to a defendant to putt forward the contention that he is a tenant coming within the purview of Act IV of 1961. That is what is expressly enacted by the Legislature.

3. The second point raised by counsel was that, it is only on the existence of a certain relationship between the parties, that the Act applies. In other words, his contention was that the relationship of the parties must be that of a tenant and landlord. Unless there is that relationship, the Act cannot have any application. He referred to the preamble of the Act and contended that the basis, for applying the Act, is the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant and that a decree settling the rights of the parties as a mortgagor and mortgagee cannot be re-opened, by applying the Act which is intended only to apply to persons occupying the positions off landlord and tenant. In this connection he cited the decision reported in AIR. 1962 SC. 547. But in my view that decision does not afford any assistance, as the question which I have to decide is something entirely different. When it is stated in S.6 of Act IV of 1961 that notwithsta


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