The central legal point established in the judgment is the significance of the timing of execution and acceptance of mortgage deeds in determining priority of mortgages.

1. The suit which gave rise to this appeal is for recovery of Rs. 3500/- that the 1st defendant owes to the plaintiff, with interest and costs, charged on plaint items Nos. 2 to 5. On March 25,1952 the 1st defendant offered to secure his debt on landed property, and on April 5,1952 he brought and delivered to plaintiff Ext. P-2, a deed of Otti, dated March 26, 1952 & registered on April 4, 1952, possessorily mortgaging plaint item No.1 for the amount with a conditional security on plaint items Nos. 2 to 5 in case of loss of the mortgaged property on account of any prior encumbrance thereon. The appellant was impleaded as the 2nd defendant stated to be a subsequent mortgagee of plaint items 2 to 5. He contended that Ext. P-2 was executed only after execution of Ext. D2 mortgage in favour of his father on March 31, 1952, and was antedated March 26, 1952, and that he was entitled to priority over the plaintiff.

The court below found priority for the plaintiff, and in this appeal the appellant challenges the same.

2. The case in the plaint, inter alia, is that Ext. P-2 which had been delivered to the plaintiff by the 1st defendant on April 5,1952 was from beginning to end fraudulent and mischievous having been drawn contrary to the understanding between the 1st defendant and the plaintiff and is therefore to be set aside. On the above pleading, counsel for the appellant contended that the charge under Ext. P-2 on the plaint items 2 to 5 could have arisen only after April 5, 1952, and that therefore the appellant has priority of mortgage as per Ext. D2 which came into effect on March 31, 1952.

3. That Ext. D2 came into effect on March 31, 1952, was not disputed before me. Ext. D2 was admittedly executed by the 1st defendant, delivered to the appellant, presented by the appellant for registration and got registered with the co-operation of the 1st defendant on March 31, 1952, and has therefore come into effect the same day creating a mortgage on plaint items 2 to 5 favour of the appellant. The question is when did the plaint items 2 to 5 come security for the plaintiff's dues.

Ext. P-2 bears date March 26, 1952, was registered on April 4, 1952 & delivered to the plaintiff on April 5, 1952. The Subordinate Judge found the plea of Ext. P-2 being antedated at its execution not been proved, and, relying on S.47 of the Registration Act, providing that a registered document operates from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made,

and not from the time of its registration, held Ext. P-2 to have come to effect on March 26, 1952.

The contention of the appellant, as formulated by counsel, is two fold: firstly, that Ext. P-2 was executed only after Ext. D-2 had come to effect; and secondly that the plaintiff cannot claim priority on the basis of a deed which he had not accepted. Strong reliance was placed on Aithros Haji v. Sekharan Nair (6 Cochin 345) wherein Anantharama Iyer, J., has observed thus:

"Under the Indian Law signing and delivery alone are necessary to give complete operation to a document. The word "execute" under the Indian Law (the Registration Act for instance) is used in the sense of "signing" and the execution of a document therefore means signing it. But as stated before the date of signing or execution need not necessarily be the date on which the deed was written up, since when once the executant affixes his signature, the deed will, as was observed in an English case, speak from the date of its execution and not from the date apparent on the face of it (Browne v. Burtin 17 L. J. Q. B. 49). There is also provision in the Registration Act for registering a deed executed by several persons at different times. (S. 24. of Act XVI of 1908). Such provision clearly shows that the date of execution of a deed need not necessarily be the date appearing on the deed so far as persons executing the deed subsequently. Hence it is very doubtful that proving the exec