The main legal point established in the judgment is that the intention necessary to complete the offence of criminal trespass can be inferred from the circumstances and the probable consequences of the act.

1958 KLT 1048; ILR XLI Mad. 156;

Judgment :-

1. Accused Kochan a Harijan and his wife Thankamma were convicted by the Chowghat First Class Magistrate under S.453 read with S.34 I.P.C. The first accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months and to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- and the second accused was ordered to be released after due admonition. In appeal the conviction was set aside by the Additional Sessions Judge, Trichur. The State has appealed against the order of acquittal

2. PW.1, Venkitarama Iyer and his wife Swarnambal [Pw-2] were in possession of a building in Panthra Paramba which was used by them for storing manure and agricultural implements. The building was locked up and the key was with Pw.1. The prosecution case is that at 6-30 A. M. on 19-5-1959 the first accused broke into the house and together with his wife occupied the building.

3. The two accused denied the offence. The second accused in the statement filed by her contended that she was permitted to live in the house of Pws.1 and 2 on payment of Rs. 22/- and that she had improved the building which was dilapidated. According to her the case is only an attempt to evict her from the building without resorting to the civil court. The first accused while supporting the second accused's case added that he was looking after the paramba and some amounts were due to him from Pw-1 as remuneration. He further stated that he had been sentenced to imprisonment in a criminal case filed against him by Pw-1 and when he came out of the jail he found his wife in occupation of the building.

4. Pw.1 and Pw-2 his wife, Pw-3 the woman who saw the incident and reported the matter to them and Pw-4 a neighbour gave evidence for the prosecution. Pw-5 the Sub-Inspector who found the door broke open with the lock pulled out and who prepared a mahazar about it was also examined. The learned Magistrate discussed their evidence in detail and found that the building was in the possession of Pws.1 and 2 kept under lock and key and that the accused broke open the building at 6-30 A. M. on 19-5-1959 and occupied it. The defence case that the second accused had been living there with the permission of Pw-1 was also found against.

5. The learned appellate judge has not adverted to the evidence in the case nor did he express any doubt regarding the correctness of the learned Magistrate's findings. He simply made short-work of the appeal by acquitting the accused on the ground that it is neither alleged nor proved that the entry into the house by the accused was with the intent to intimidate, insult or annoy. Pws.1 and 2, the persons in occupation. The learned Public Prosecutor's argument that intention to annoy could be presumed from the evidence was repelled and in support of the position taken by him the learned judge relied upon a portion picked out from Ratanlal's Law of Crimes, in the commentary on S.441 without apparently making any attempt to see whether the decisions cited therein can properly be applied to the facts of the case before him.

6. Now, the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor in the lower court, that the intention of the trespasser can be inferred from his acts, is in my opinion, sound and should have been accepted by the court. If one were to insist on direct evidence on the mental attitude of the offender, very few cases of criminal trespass will result in conviction, for the trespasser will but rarely make a public proclamation of his intentions. It is a safe presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts and if insult or annoyance will be the inevitable consequence of his acts he can rightly be presumed to intend that result.

7. In Moideen Metharu v. Kandan 1958 K.L.T. 1048 a division bench decision of the Kerala High Court, Iyengar, J. held that:

"While the fact that a trespass causes or is likely to cause annoyance to a person in possession may by itself be insufficient to justify a conviction, the presumption of t