The judgment establishes the legal principle that bye-laws framed under an Act in exercise of delegated power of legislation have the force of law and can be judicially noticed. It also clarifies the admissibility of public documents as evidence.

1. The Secretary of the Malabar Market Committee, Kozhikode, is the appellant. The respondent is a licensee under the Malabar Market Committee dealing in arecanuts and having business within five miles of the regulated market at Vattamkulam. Under by-law 25 (6) framed under the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act XX of 1933, every such licensee is bound to submit the returns of his business transactions in the prescribed form to the Secretary of the Market Committee as and when required by him. On 1-1-1960 the complainant sent a registered notice to the respondent calling upon him to furnish returns of his transactions for the year 1959 in compliance with bye-law 25 (6). Since the respondent did not furnish the returns a further notice was sent to him intimating that a prosecution will be launched in case he failed to submit the returns within ten days. As the respondent failed to furnish the returns even then, the complainant filed C.C. No. 14 of 1960 on the file of the Munsiff-Magistrate of Ponnani under S.19 (2) of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act read with byelaw 25 (6) and 25 (18) of the bye-laws framed under the said Act. The respondent had no case that he furnished the returns or that there was any ground to exempt him from the liability to furnish the returns. The only defence set up by the respondent was that the prosecution launched by the appellant as Secretary of the Committee was not maintainable since there was no proper proof of the appellant's authority to prosecute. This objection seems to have been put forward on the ground that the certified copy of the resolution authorising the Secretary to launch the prosecution filed before the Magistrate is not admissible in evidence. The sustainability of the prosecution appears to have been challenged on the further ground that the bye-laws which formed the basis of it are not proved.

2. Both these objections were accepted by the Magistrate and the accused was acquitted. On the first objection the Magistrate held that the minutes book is not a public document as defined in S.74 of the Indian Evidence Act and no ground is made out as contemplated in S.65 of the Act to allow secondary evidence to be given. Regarding the second objection the learned Magistrate took the view that as the bye-laws of the committee cannot claim any statutory force the court cannot take judicial notice of them

3. I shall first consider the question whether the court could have acted upon the bye-laws in the absence of proof or in other words whether judicial notice of the bye-laws could have been taken under S.57 of the Evidence Act.

4.Under S.57 of the Evidence Act the court is required to take judicial notice of the facts specified in Clause.1 to 13 and Clause.1 is "all laws in force in the territory of India". In Edward Mills Co v. State of Ajmer, AIR. 1955 Supreme Court 25 while interpreting the words "Law in force" as used in Art.372 of the Constitution their Lordships observed that: -

"the words "law in force" as used in Art.372 are wide enough to include not merely a legislative enactment but also any regulation or order which has the force of law. However, an order must be a legislative and not an executive order before it can come within the definition of law".

In State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, AIR. 1951 Supreme Court 318 a notification issued by the Government under the Bombay Excise Act was held to be one having the force of law and as if made by the legislature itself. Following these decisions the Madhya Bharat High Court in State v. Gopala Singh, AIR. 1956 Madhya Bharat 138, in dealing with the question whether judicial notice of a Government notification can be taken under S.57 of the Evidence Act held that:

"Judicial notice can, therefore, be taken of a notification issued by the Government or any competent authority in the exercise of delegated power of legislation, as such a notification is a part of the law itself. Judicial notice cannot, however, be taken