1. In this writ petition, under Art.226 of the Constitution. Mr. S. Easwara Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioners, attacks the limited manner in which the learned Advocate General has given sanction to institute the suit to the petitioners under S.92, CPC..

2. In fairness to the learned counsel, it must be stated that there is no attack whatsoever either against the manner In which the proceedings were conducted by the learned Advocate General, nor even against the actual decision taken by the Advocate-General in the circumstances of this case.

3. But the main attack, so far as we could gather, is that though the plaintiffs asked for reliefs on various grounds in the draft plaint filed by them and marked as Ext. P in these proceedings, the ultimate sanction given by the Advocate-General, confining the reliefs only to clauses (A) and (I) practically makes the filing of the suit illusory as not serving any purpose at all.

4. According to Mr. S. Easwara Iyer, in considering the question of granting a sanction under S.92, C.P.C. the learned Advocate-General, who functions under the provisions of S.92, CPC., should be considered to be discharging judicial function or at any rate, quasi-judicial function. In such a case, it is further urged that a decision taken ultimately by him, can be reviewed by this Court, in a proper case, under Art.226 of the Constitution. Mr. Easwara Iyer further urged that even on the basis that the learned Advocate-General discharges purely administrative functions, nevertheless, it is open to this Court to consider the correctness of the decision ultimately taken by the Advocate-General in a proper case. Therefore, the main grievance of the petitioners is that the learned Advocate-General has really not granted the plaintiff-petitioners sanction to institute the suit as they intended claiming all the reliefs, but has really restricted it, according to the learned counsel without giving any proper reasons, to only two of the reliefs asked for in the plaint.

S. 92 of the CPC. is as follows:

Public Charities. - (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate General, may institute a suit, whether contentious or not in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject matter of the trust is situate, to obtain a decree

(a) removing any trustee;

(b) appointing a new trustee;

(c) vesting any property in a trustee;

(cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property;

(d) directing accounts and inquiries;

(e) declaring what proportion of the trust-property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;

(f) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;

(g) settling a scheme, or

(h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.

(2) Save as provided by the Religions Endowments Act, 1863, or by any corresponding law in force in the territories which immediately before the 1st November 1956, were comprised in Part B States no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section".

5. It will be seen that under S.92 the Advocate-General himself can institute a suit in the interest of the trust or give sanction to two or more persons