1. The first defendant, who is the appellant in C.M.A. 36 of 1959, was appointed receiver of the suit property, and the predecessor of the appellants in C. M. A. 122 of 1959 stood guarantee for the due performance of his duties and obligations under the receiving order. The receivership was terminated on 19-8-1947 by a specific order of the court On 1-11-1950, the plaintiff moved C M. P. 1911 of 1950 to call upon the receiver and his surety to make a deposit of Rs. 600/- which the receiver was admittedly bound to have deposited in court as the income of the property under his management. On February 2,1959, the learned Subordinate Judge, Cochin, passed the impugned order directing the receiver and his surety to make the deposit in one month.

2. The receiver contends that the only court which can call him to order is the court which appointed him; and cited in support Chaparadi v. Kabil Molla (AIR 1943 Calcutta 244) and Fatechand Tarachand v. Parashram Maghanmal (AIR. 1953 Bombay 101), where the expression'court' occurring in 0.40 R.4 CPC. has been held to refer to the court which appointed the receiver, and no other. The question that came up for consideration in those c