The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of S.20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the application of S.16(1)(a) and (d) to the case.

1. This appeal brought by the complainant by special leave under S.417 (3), Criminal Procedure Code, is against the acquittal of the three accused persons in the case of offences falling under clauses (a) and (d) of S.16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and punishable under clause (i) thereof.

2. The complaint was laid by a Food Inspector duly appointed under S.9 of the Act, and all Food Inspectors have been generally authorised by the State Government to institute prosecutions for offences under the Act. (See the notifications, P 15 and P 19). Nevertheless preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the accused on the score that the prosecution was not in accordance with S.20 (1) of the Act, that cognizance was therefore barred, and that, the trial by the learned magistrate was altogether without jurisdiction. It is said that S.20 (1) does not contemplate a general authorisation as in Ext. P. 19, but requires a special authorisation for each particular case, and the case reported in Food Inspector v. Arunachalam Chettiar, 1960 K.L.T. 515 =19601 K.L.R. 582, is cited in support of this proposition.

3. S 20 (1) of the Act runs as follows:

"No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or a local authority."

What I might call the first clause of the section requires that the prosecution shall be instituted by, or with the written consent of, the State Government or a local authority while, what I might call the second clause, offers the alternative of the prosecution being instituted by, or with the written consent of, a person authorised in that behalf by the State Government or a local authority. Now, the institution of a prosecution whether it be by the of State Government or a local authority binder the first clause, or by a duly authorised person under the second clause, can only be for a particular offence committed by a particular person. And it is fairly clear that the written consent, whether by the State Government or local authority, or by the authorised person, must be with reference to a particular offence committed by a particular person. There can be no general consent for the prosecution of all offenders. It seems to me equally clear that the authorisation under the second clause can be a general authorisation to institute, or give consent to prosecutions for offences under the Act. What the second clause enables is a general delegation of the power given to the State Government and local authorities under the first clause, and, the words, "authorised in this behalf" appearing in the second clause mean, authorised to institute, or give consent to, any prosecution for an offence under the Act, in other words, to exercise the power conferred on the State Government and local authorities by the first clause. They cannot be restricted in their scope ,by relating them to the words, "an offence" appearing at the beginning of the section and saying that the authorisation must be in respect of each offence. For, if that were what the second clause meant then it might as well not have been enacted at all. The written consent permitted by the first clause would have served the purpose. The State Government or local authority could as well act under the first clause and give written consent in each case instead of considering each case and then authorising somebody else to institute, or to give consent to, a prosecution. The special provision for authorisation contained in the second clause would become quite meaningless. It is obvious that the very object of the second clause is to enable the State Government and local authorities to appoint some other person to exercise on their behalf the discretion vested in them by the first clause since, if the State Government or the local authorities had to consider each particular case a