The main legal point established in the judgment is the significance of the terms used in the document and the nature of the relationship between the parties in determining whether a transaction is a mortgage or a tenancy, particularly in the context of the Malabar Tenancy Act.

1. This Civil Revision Petition is by the defendant in a suit for redemption of a mortgage and recovery of possession of property with arrears of purapad. Defendants 3 to 5 had a contention that the transaction on the basis of which recovery of possession was sought was a kanam as defined in the Malabar Tenancy Act, 14 of 1930, and additional issue No. 10 was in these terms.

"Is the plaint transaction a mortgage or a tenancy."

The trial court repelled the defence contention and held that it was a mortgage. The correctness of this finding is canvassed in this revision petition.

2. The transaction in question is evidenced by a Kaivasampanaya deed (RRWvwkepLiLgU) executed on 22-1-1898 by the plaintiff's ancestor in favour of Cheeramma, mother of defendants 1 and 2, for a sum of Rs. 300/- and a panaya kychit (Ext. A-1) executed by the latter on the same date. Cheeramma was to appropriate Rs. 18/- towards interest on Rs. 300/-, adjust Rs. 4-7-7 towards revenue and Rs. 20-8-5 for putting up fences and thatching the building etc. and out of the surplus of profits she was to pay Rs. 32/-as purapad and Re. 1/- as the cost of two bunches of plantains. Interest on arrears of purapad or tax was also provided for and it was also stipulated that Cheeramma's rights could be sold for realisation of such arrears. The term was fixed as one year. The question is whether this transaction is a kanam as defined in the Malabar Tenancy Act.

3. Both sides referred to decisions of this court in support of the respective position contended for but it may be observed that these are not of much help as the decision in each case is based on the nature of the document sued on and the points raised in the case. I may in this connection refer to the oft-quoted words of Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem (1901) A. C. 495:11 there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a rase is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all."

Thus, in Janardhanan v. Kuppandy & Another (1959 KLT. 118), the maim question argued before the Full Bench was whether the expressions, "called the "kanamdar' " and "called 'kanarthom' " in S.3 (14) which defines 'kanam' meant that the Act applied only to transactions where the words 'kanam' and 'kanarthom were used. It was held that the use of these expressions in the document was not essential if the transaction satisfied the requirements of kanam as defined in the Act. In Emmuni Panicker v. Krishna Panicker (1958 KLT. 756), Varadaraja Iyengar, J., held that the absence of a term of 12 years and a provision for payment of renewal fees as well as the inclusion of a specific provision for sale given to the transferee were not material and that the transaction in question was a kanam. The latest decision on the point is Krishnankutty v. Padmanabha Menon and another (1960 KLT. 294). Vaidialingam,J., construed the document in that case as a usufructuary mortgage and pointed out that the real test was to see whether the relationship was that of a debtor and creditor or of a landlord and lessee. This view is in consonance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramdhan Puri v. Bankey Behari (AIR 1958 SC. 941). As observed earlier the decisions in these cases finally rest on the terms of the deed.

4. So far as the plaint transaction is concerned I have