The main legal point established in the judgment is that a juridical person, including companies, is entitled to sue in forma pauperis under 0.33, R.1, C.P.C. if it meets the criteria of a pauper. The interpretation of the term 'person' in the context of pauper suits was crucial to the court's decision.

1. The point for decision in this Revision Petition is whether a company as a juridical person is entitled to sue in forma pauperis under 0.33, R.1, C.P.C.

2. The contention raised before us is that the terms of 0.33, R.1, C.P.C. confer the privilege of suing as a pauper only upon a 'person' and that the word must for the purpose of 0.33 mean only 'natural person' as distinguished from 'juridical persons' such as Corporations, Companies, Associations or idols. In support of this proposition reliance has been placed firstly upon the case reported in S.M. Mitra v. Corporation of Royal Exchange Assurance (AIR. 1930 Rang. 259). In that case the applicant was an official receiver who applied to sue in forma pauperis. It was held.

"Word 'person' in 0.33 means 'natural person', that is, a human being and does not include a juridical person such as a Receiver and therefore a Receiver appointed under the Provincial Insolvency Act cannot be allowed to sue as a pauper, where the Receiver himself is possessed of sufficient funds to carry on the suit, though the estate of which he is the Receiver may not be sufficient for that purpose".

One of the learned judges constituting the Bench referred to R.3, 4 and 7 of 0.33, C.P.C. and thought that they indicated that it would be repugnant in the subject or context to attach a wider meaning to that word.

3. A contrary view had been taken by a Division Bench of the same High Court in an earlier case in D.K. Cassim & Sons v. Abdul Rahman (AIR. 1930 Rang. 272) where it was held that a firm can be considered as a person within the meaning of 0.33. R.1, C P. C, having regard to the definition of that term in the General Clauses Act (X of 1897). Probably this decision was not brought to the notice of their Lordships when they decided the case in AIR. 1930 Rang 259.

4. The next case cited for the petitioner is the case in Bharat Abhyudoy Cotton Mills v. Maharaja of Darbhanga (AIR. 1938 Cal. 745). That case arose under 0. 44, R.1, C.P.C., and therein it was said that all provisions of 0.33 must be read together and so read the word "person" in 0.33, R.1 and the same word in 0.44, R.1, C.P.C. does not include a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. In support of the view that it was not possible and competent for a company to sue as a pauper or to prefer an appeal as a pauper under the provisions of 0.44, R.1, C.P.C., it was observed that in the context in which the word "person" occurred in O.33, C.P.C., it was impossible to give it the extended meaning as contemplated by S. 3, Clause.39, General Clauses Act. Reference in this connection was made to the latter portion of the explanation attached to R.1, whereby the applicant is required to show that he is not entitled to the property worth Rs. 100/- other than his necessary wearing apparel. It was further pointed out that under R.3 the application to sue as a pauper has to be presented to the court by the applicant in person and under R.4 an applicant may be examined by the court at the time when the petition is presented.

5. To the same effect is the decision in Associated Pictures Ltd. v. The National Studios Ltd. (AIR. 1951 Punjab 447). All these cases proceeded upon the same grounds in order to limit the scope of 0.33, R.1, C.P.C.

6. The decision of this question turns upon the construction of 0.33, R.1, C. P. C. which runs as follows: "Subject to the following provision, any suit may be instituted by a pauper.

Explanation: A person is a 'pauper' when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit, or, where no such fee is prescribed, when he is not entitled to property worth Rs. 100 other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject matter of the suit."

There is no definition of 'person' in the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore the interpretation of the said term in the General Clauses Act would apply according to which a 'person' shall include any company or