The main legal point established in the judgment is the court's emphasis on the limitations to the exercise of special jurisdiction under Art.226 and the circumstances under which certiorari will lie.

1. This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution by R.K.V. Motors and Timbers (Private) Ltd., a motor transport company, for the issue of a writ of certiorari, quashing the order Ext. B, dated the 31st January 1959, passed by the first respondent, who is the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Trivandrum, granting a temporary stage carriage permit to the second respondent, the Director of State Transport, Kerala State, for the route Trivandrum (Cantonment)-Neyyattinkara via Kattakada. This route, among others was served by the petitioner, for about six or seven years in the past, by providing motor transport under a stage carriage permit held by it. The Jaya Service (Private) Ltd., Neyyattinkara, or shortly the Jaya Service, is another motor transport company, who had been similarly serving the same route, under a stage carriage permit held by it, till a few months before the date of this petition when it ceased to do so. On the 21st January 1959, the petitioner made an application to the first respondent, for the issue to it of a temporary permit for an additional bus to operate the same route, on the ground, that the Jaya Service had defaulted in service; this was rejected on the same day, by the order, copy of which is Ext. A. On the 30th January 1959, the second respondent applied to the 1st respondent, for the issue to the department of a temporary permit for one of its buses, on the ground, that there was public need of departmental transport service to operate on the same route. By Ext. B, the order sought to be quashed, a temporary permit was granted to the 2nd respondent to operate a service on the route, for a period of four months from the 1st February 1959, in substitution of the service operated by the Jaya Service The petitioner's chief contention is that the grant of a temporary permit to the 2nd respondent, was not warranted by the terms of S.62 of the M. V. Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as the Act and was therefore wanting in jurisdiction.

2. The learned Government Pleader, who appeared for both respondents has placed in my hands, the papers in the office of the 1st respondent, relating to the issue of the permits. He has raised a two-fold objection to the issue of a writ under Art.226 of the Constitution as prayed for; firstly, that if Ext. B was illegal the petitioner had its remedy under S.64 A of the Act, by way of revision to the State Transport Authority, and secondly, that by applying on the 21st January 1959 for the issue of a temporary permit, the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority represented by the 1st respondent, and that it cannot now be heard to contend against it, and impeach Ext. B, as lacking in jurisdiction. Two reported cases decided by this court which were mentioned by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in which temporary permits issued by the Regional Transport Authority were quashed, are Balagangadharan v. R.T. Board; 1957 K.L. T. 1259 and Kunju Menon v. Secretary R. T. Board, Trichur, A. I. R.1957 T. C. 255; but in these no preliminary objection to the competency of the petitioner under Art.226, was raised or determined. The first of the above objections was, however, pointedly raised in New Kerald Bus Transport v. Regional Transport Authority, Cannanore, 1959 K.L.T. 405, and upheld by T.K. Joseph, J. following two decisions of the Supreme Court, notably the decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86 which has laid down the limitations, to the exercise of this special jurisdiction by the Court.

3. In deciding the preliminary objection, it has to be taken, that the petitioner has a good and sustainable case on the merits. The case of State of Utter Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh has decided that though there is no rule that certiorari will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy provided the requisite grounds exist, it will lie, notwithstanding a right of appeal. But or