The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of Hindu Mitakshara Law and the Code of Civil Procedure to determine the liability of the 2nd defendant and the validity of the assignment, clarifying the limited liability of the son under the doctrine of pious obligation and the conditions for the second proviso to r.16 of O. XXI to be applicable.

1. The 2nd defendant's challenge to the right of the assignee-decroe-holder to execute the decree has given rise to this appeal. The decree is in favour of the Lakshmi Prasad Bank Ltd., and it is based on a promissory-note executed by defendants 1 and 2. These two defendants are brothers who have become divided in interest. They are governed by Hindu Mitakshara Law. Under the decree both the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the debt due to the bank. The 1st defendant's son obtained an assignment of the decree on payment of the entire decree debt to the bank and himself, along with the original decree-holder, filed an execution petition praying for recognition of the assignment and for permitting the assignee to proceed with the execution of the decree. When notice was served on the judgment-debtors, the 2nd defendant appeared and contended that execution should not be allowed to proceed. The main objections raised by him are that he joined in the execution of the plaint promissory-note merely as a surety for the 1st defendant and therefore the primary liability is on the 1st defendant, that the assignee who is the son of the 1st defendant is equally liable for the decree-debt and as such he is not entitled to execute the decree against the other judgment-debtors and that the assignment itself has been taken by the 1st defendant with his own funds and for his own benefit and hence the benamidar should not be permitted to execute the decree. All these objections were overruled by the execution court and hence this appeal.

2. The first objection that the appellant-2nd defendant joined in the execution of the promissory-note only as a surety for the 1st defendant, was not pressed at the hearing of the appeal. There is little substance in that objection. The decree, as it stands, makes both the defendants equally liable and hence it is not open to the 2nd defendant to raise a contention against the terms of the decree. The next objection is based on the second proviso to r.16 of 0. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. That proviso is to the effect that where a decree for the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others In order to attract this proviso, it is obvious that the transferee or assignee of the decree must be one of the persons made liable under the decree for payment of the debt. In the present case the decree is only against defendants 1 and 2 and not against the assignee also. However, it is argued on behalf of the appellant that under the Mitakshara Law, the assignee, who is the son of the 1st defendant, is also liable for the debt of the father. No doubt, under the doctrine of pious obligation recognised by Mitaskshara Law, the son has an obligation to discharge the debts of his father under certain exceptional circumstances. This liability of the son is subject to certain well-recognised limitations. It is not that any debt of the father can be enforced against the son. The extent to which the son can be made liable for the debt of the father has been explained by the Supreme Court in Pannalal v. Mt. Naraini (A.I.R.1952 S. C. 170) in the following terms:

"The position therefore is that the son is not personally liable for the debt of his father even if the debt was not incurred for an immoral purpose and the obligation is limited to the assets received by him in his share of the joint family property or to his interest in such property and it does not attach to his self-acquisitions. The duty being religious or moral, it ceases to exist if the debt is tainted with immorality or vice."

This limited liability of the son for the father's debt is certainly different from the legal liability of the son for the debts due from him under a decree against him. Where he is himself a judgment-debtor his liability is unqualified. The assignment of a decree would come within the mischief of the second proviso to R.16 of O. XX