The court established that the period of the pendency of a petition under the Travancore Debt Relief Act could be excluded for limitation purposes under S.14 (2) of the Limitation Act if the claim was being prosecuted and the court was unable to entertain it due to the judgment-debtor's default.

1. This second appeal is by a judgment-debtor whose objection to execution on the score of limitation has been overruled by the courts below.

2. The decree in question, a money decree, was passed on 22-3-1119 M. E., and the present application for execution, which is the only application so far, was filed on 21-5-1123, four years and two months after the decree. But even before the decree, the judgment-debtor had, on 20-10-1116, instituted a petition (D.R.P. No. 292 of 1116) in the District Court of Alleppey for a settlement of his debts under S.16 of the Travancore Debt Relief Act, Act II of 1116. To this petition, the present decree-holder was impleaded as a party on 14-2-1119 in respect of the very claim on which the decree was passed a month later; and on 26-3-1119 he appeared before court in response to a notice issued under S.17 (2) of the Act and filed a memorandum claiming the amount due to him and demanding priority in the matter of payment. The petition was eventually dismissed on 14-4-1122 for want of prosecution and with it went the decree-holder's memorandum. The only question for decision in this appeal is whether the period of the pendency of the petition can be excluded for purposes of limitation under S.14 (2) of the Limitation Act.

3. We think it can. That D.R.P. No. 292 of 1116, and, in particular the claim made therein by the present decree-holder, were civil proceedings between the same parties in respect of the same matter is not, and indeed cannot, be disputed. Nor is it alleged that, in respect of those proceedings, there was any want of due diligence or good faith on the part of the present decree-holder. It was solely by reason of the judgment-debtor's default that the main petition had to be dismissed; and the main petition having gone, the court found itself unable to deal with the decree-holder's claim. That being so, the only question that needs to be answered in the affirmative before giving the decree-holder the benefit of S.14 (2) of the Limitation Act is whether it can be said that he was prosecuting that proceeding against the present judgment-debtor for the same relief, and whether the court was unable to entertain his claim from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature.

4. We have little difficulty in answering the question in the affirmative. The Travancore Debt Relief Act makes provision for the full settlement of the debt of a person, who is unable to pay his debts and who unconditionally leaves all his assets in the control of the court, in a manner analogous to insolvency proceedings, the principal difference being that one-fourth of the entire assets (not exceeding Rs. 3,000 in value) is saved for the debtor and the balance alone distributed amongst his creditors. Under S.16 (3) of the Act, the debtor has to furnish full particulars of all claims against him together with the names and addresses of his creditors, (also of all claims he has against others); and under S.17 (2) the court has to give notice of the hearing of the application to all the parties to the proceedings. It is in response to such a notice that the present decree-holder appeared and submitted his claim. Under S.18 of the Act, the court has to determine the admissibility and the amount of each claim, and in determining this has to follow as far as possible the procedure prescribed in the Travancore Insolvency Act.

5. Thus we find that the present decree-holder had, in D.R.P. No. 292 of 1116, made a claim against the present judgment-debtor for the same relief, namely, the payment of the debt which is the subject matter of the present decree. That in the array of parties in that proceeding he was shown as a respondent and not as a petitioner does not affect the position. It was not as if he was merely resisting the petition and asking that it should be dismissed. On the contrary, he filed a memorandum claiming payment of the money due to him, and that claim he was prosecuting until the dismissal