The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Art.182 of the Limitation Act in the context of the execution of the decree, as well as the impact of the Part B states Laws Act III of 1951 on the repealed Travancore Law and its relevance to the registration of the decree.

1. The matter arises in execution of the decree, on objection raised by the respondent - 5th defendant, that the execution of the decree is barred by limitation, as regards personal execution for realisation of the mesne profits, granted under the decree. The court below upheld the objection and hence this appeal by the assignee-decree-holder.

2. The decree set aside a mortgage which stood in favour of the 5th defendant in respect of plaint item No. 3 and allowed recovery of the same, with past and future mesne profits. The decree was passed on 4-3-1121. On 18-10 -1123, the first execution application was filed, praying inter alia for recovery of the mesne profits but only 'as a charge against the properties'. The prayer for personal execution against the 5th defendant was for the first time made in the second execution petition dated 22-6-1953, but as by then, more than three years had elapsed from the date of the decree the court below held such prayer was barred by limitation under Art.182. The assumption, apparently, was that the portion of the decree which granted mesne profits amounted to a separate decree by itself and limitation therefor in execution must be computed on its own basis apart from the rest. This was precisely the argument which was sought to be advanced in Lekshminarasimham v. suryanarayana, A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 246 and Govindarajachari, J. with whom Gentle C.J. agreed, held, rejecting the contention:

"There was only one decree within the meaning of Art 182 notwithstanding that it included several reliefs based upon distinct causes of action and that it was open to the decree-holder to rely clause (5) and ask for limitation to be calculated from the dates of the final orders in the previous execution petitions notwithstanding that those petitions sought execution of reliefs other than that sought in the subsequent one."

Learned Judges referred to and relied upon the earlier decision in Kanniammal v. Balakrishna Tharvady, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 557 where the discussion principally turned on Art.182(2) of the Limitation Act, and the following observations were made:

In all cases, what Art.182(2) of the Limitation Act refers to is a decree, viz., one decree, and it is not permissible for Courts in execution to look into the matter and any that, as there are several reliefs which are severable, the decree, although normally one decree consists of several decrees."

Our attention has been drawn to Krishna Kammathy v. Kunjan,1950 D.L.R. T-C 274 where an execution application for attachment and sale of certain properties and filed after four years of a previous application directed against another set of properties, was held to be a fresh application and this was held to be barred. The facts of that case are not clear from the report and there is also no discussion and it is probable that the court was then faced with the 12 years' rule also under s.41 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code corresponding to s.48 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code. For, there could be no question of a fresh application if the previous one was still pending and 12 years had not elapsed from date of the decree. Anyhow that aspect does not arise here. It would follow therefore that the conclusion of the court below that execution was barred is, on the basis it adopted, unsustainable.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent then said that execution must be held to be still barred in this case, because the second execution application was filed more than three years after, though within six years of the disposal of the first. The argument is that even though the decree related to immovable property and a memorandum thereof was entered or filed as required by s.15 of the Travancore Registration Act II of 1087 so as to attract the larger period of limitation of six years under Art.166 of the Travancore Limitation Act (VI of 1100) the smaller period of three years alone is now available under the different wording of Art.182 of the repealing In