The legal capacity of parties under the relevant Acts and sections, and the sufficiency of evidence in proving allegations of fraud and unfairness, were the central legal principles established in the judgment.

1. This appeal is by the plaintiffs in a suit for reopening a prior partition in their tarwad, on grounds of its invalidity and fraud and unfairness otherwise, and for fresh partition The suit was dismissed by the court below in toto and hence this appeal. There is also a cross objection by certain members of the tarwad, forming the group of defendants 6,16,17 and 18.

2. We are concerned in this appeal with only one of the grounds put forward in the court below for invalidating the prior partition arrangement to which all the majors for the time being were parties and evidenced by Ext. M, that is to say, that the 1st plaintiff, who according to the plaintiffs was in fact a major, was dealt with as a minor under Ext. M. The fraud or unfairness which were said to have

characterised Ext. M are, for our purpose, confined to two transactions, viz (i) Ext. M release of a tarwad mortgage by the karanavan to two junior members, and (ii) execution of Ext. AD mortgage of tarwad properties by the karanavan and senior anandravars in favour of strangers. We will take up these one after the other.

3. Taking up first, the aspect of invalidity of Ext. M arising from the personal non-participation therein of the 1st plaintiff, the question depends on whether she had attained majority on 5-6-1099 the date of Ext. M. Admittedly she was born on 17-3-1082 and was therefore less than 18 years of age then. Now the Travancore Majority Act 7 of 1099 prescribing 18 as the age of majority came into force only a few months after Ext. M viz., on 27-11-1099. There was however the Full Bench decision of the Travancore High Court in Kochuvariathu v. Sachidananda Aiyar,12 T. L. J.1 (F. B.) though by majority, but passed earlier on 27-4-1097, holding. The age of majority for contractual purposes, for a person in respect of whom the Civil Court has not been moved under the Guardian and Wards Regulation to exercise its jurisdiction, is that fixed by the Common Law of the State, which is sixteen."

On this basis it was argued for the 1st plaintiff that to the extent she had passed 16 by Ext. M date, she must be deemed to have come of age so as to be able to participate in Ext. M along with other adults, and to the extent she was not so allowed, Ext. M must be treated as void and ineffectual so far at any rate, as she and her children, the plaintiffs 2 to 4 Were concerned. The court below got over the argument by placing reliance on the definition of 'minor' in Section (2) of the Nair Act I of 1088 governing the parties.

"'Minor' means a person who has not completed eighteen years of age".

and to a similar definition in the Travancore Registration Act under which Ext. M was registered.

4. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs appellants strenuously argued before us that the partition arrangement under Ext. M fell outside the scope of the express provisions of the Nair Act above referred to. It must therefore be governed by S.26(2) therein,

"Nothing in this Regulation shall - (1)...

(2) affect the existing Rules of Marumakkathayam law, custom or usage, except to the extent hereinafter expressly provided for."

The common law age of majority, so the argument ran, must therefore govern the capacity of parties for purpose of joining in Ext. M. The argument is ingenious but is unacceptable. For, the transaction as hereby way of partition, involves enough absolute transfers covered by S.19 of the Nair Act dealing with sale & c.

5. No doubt Spencer, J. in Indoji Jithaji v. K. Rama Charlu,1920 Mad. 20 observed:

"It (partition) effects a change in the mode of enjoyment of property, but it is not an act of conveying property from one living person to another."

But in the absence of any other authority to agree with those observations, the learned judges in Rasa Goundan v. Arunachala Goundan,1923 Mad. 577, accepted the views of the Calcutta High Court in Atrabannessa Bibi v. Safatukkah Mia,1916 Cal. 645, I.L.R. 43 Cal. 504.

"The object of a suit for partition is to alter the form