The court clarified the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, regarding the enforcement of tribunal awards and the validity of compromises leading to such awards.

1. This is an appeal from the order of M. S. Menon, J., dated 22-2-1956 in O. P. No. 266 of 1955 dismissing the appellant's application for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or direction concerning the award dated 27-12-1951 of the Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum, the award dated 28-8-1954 passed on appeal therefrom by the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, III Branch and the demand notice dated 28-9-1955 issued to the appellant by the Tahsildar, Agasteeswaram Taluk at Nagercoil. The appellant before us who was the petitioner before the learned judge was formerly the licencee of the Nagercoil Electric Supply Corporation and while the said concern was under his management fourteen workmen happened to bo retrenched, As a result of that a strike was organised by the workmen and consequent on it fourteen others happened to be dismissed. The cause of the retrenched and the dismissed workmen was taken up by the South Travancore Electric Workers' Union and eventually the Government referred the disputes for adjudication by the Trivandrum Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal passed an interim award on 27-12-1951 and after some abortive attempts to get the same quashed by the Travancore-Cochin High Court, it was taken up in appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India. The Appellate Tribunal disposed of the appeal on 26-8-1954 on the basis of an agreement entered into by the parties before it. The amounts due as per the Appellate Tribunal's award remaining unpaid, the workmen moved the Government through the Labour Commissioner for realisation of the amounts by resort to the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act as provided in S.20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of 1950). The Government accordingly directed the authorities of the Revenue Department to take the necessary steps for recovering the amount from the appellant and a demand notice was issued to him to pay an amount of Rs. 6195-2-0 which according to the concerned workmen was due to them pursuant to the Appellate Tribunal's award. In Original Petition No. 266 of 1955 the validity of the two awards and that of the demand notice were challenged, but as pointed out in the order under appeal there was no specific prayer to quash either the two awards or the demand notice issued to the appellant. All the same the learned judge dealt with the petition before him as if the needed prayers were there and ultimately dismissed the petition with costs. Hence this appeal.

2. Learned Counsel for the appellant repeated before us the various grounds urged before the learned Single Judge to quash the awards and the demand notice. The first point argued was that the application for enforcement of the award was time-barred. Reference was made to S.19 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which provides that:-" An award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under S.17-A. S.17-A is to the effect that an award shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under S.17. The point of the argument was that as the original award was published on 29-1-1952 it became enforceable from 1-3-1952 and that as the demand notice was issued only on 29-8-55 beyond the one year referred to in S.19 (3) the award had become unenforceable. Apart from the fact that we cannot subscribe to the view that S.19 (3) prescribes a period of limitation for enforcement of an award, the argument overlooks the provisions in S.16 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 3950. The learned Single Judge has quoted in his judgment S.16 and as pointed out there once the Appellate Tribunal modifies an award of the Industrial Tribunal the appellate Tribunal's award alone subsists and that alone is capable of enforcement and not the superseded original award. The first point taken in the appeal therefore fails. We may h