The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the Ext. I partition deed, which determined the nature of Cheeru's interest in the property and influenced the court's decision regarding the validity of the alienation by Cheeru and Raman.

1. This appeal is by the defendants in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of property with mesne profits.

2. The property scheduled to the plaint originally belonged to Unti Raman. Under Ext. I partition arrangement of 1084 in regard to the plaint and other properties, between Raman, his brother Krishnan and their two sisters, Raman did not take any share for himself and was content with a provision for contribution of certain amount every month by two of the allottees. But at the same time the suit property was allotted to Raman's wife Cheeru for her enjoyment for life and thereafter to be taken by her four brothers specifically named. Cheeru died in Kumbhom 1124. But even during her life-time herself along with Raman gave away the property to the defendants, sons of Krishnan by Ext. A deed of assignment dated 16.10.1088. The plaintiff obtained sale of the property from Cheeru's brothers and their legal representatives in 1951 under Exts. J, K and L. According to the plaintiff Ext. A assignment deed executed by Raman and Cheeru was wanting in authority and did not affect the interest of Cheeru's brothers in the property under Ext. I and therefore the plaintiff's title derived from them. The suit was therefore laid on 11.2.1952 as above said for declaration of title and recovery of the property with mesne profits.

3. The defendants contested the suit mainly on the footing that Ext. I partition of 1084 had been executed merely to shield the properties from the creditors of Raman and did not come into operation and therefore Ext. A assignment deed to which Raman also was party effectively conveyed the title in the property to the defendants. Alternatively and assuming Ext. I was operative, Cheeru obtained not a mere life-interest but the absolute title in the property under and by virtue of Ext. I terms and Ext. A in which she had joined was still valid and effective. In any view, the plaintiff could not maintain the suit on title.

4. The court below, on the main contention, found that Ext. I partition arrangement was genuine and had come into effect. On question of construction, it found that Cheeru got only a life-interest in the property, the remainder vesting absolutely in her brothers. The defendants were therefore held not entitled to retain the property as against the plaintiff, but as they had put up valuable building in the property, the plaintiff was directed to pay the improvement value before recovery. Hence this appeal by the defendants as above said.

5. The main question raised for our consideration in this appeal is whether the construction of Ext. I partition deed adopted by the court below is any way incorrect.

The relevant clauses of Ext. I are Clause.4, 10 and 13. Clause.4 provided in the first instance for the allotment of the disputed property in favour of Raman's wife Cheeru and the reasons therefor were mentioned, as, that she was childless and besides, had exerted herself considerably in protecting the properties covered by Ext. I. Clause.10 then said that in respect of the property allotted as above to Cheeru, she should not deal with the property by sale or otherwise during Raman's life time and that after her, the property should devolve on her four brothers particularly named. Clause.13 finally wound up by saying that the various allottees under the document were to take the respective properties free of other persons' claims and absolutely with right to get patta and enjoy for all time and further that the properties would descend as Makkavazhi properties and not in the Marumakkavazhi line.

6. Mr. T.S. Venkiteswara Iyer, learned Counsel for the appellant strongly urged before us that the Clause.4 and 13 read together showed that the allotment was to Cheeru and Cheeru alone absolutely and that Clause.10 was in the circumstances merely otiose. According to him the allottee under Clause.4 was Cheeru by herself and not Cheeru and her brothers, so that when Clause.13 provided for absolute