The main legal point established in the judgment is that the daughter's right to streedhanam under the Christian Succession Act is independent of the personal contract and the charge on the father's property is not limited by the enforceability of the promise.

1. Plaintiff is the appellant in this second appeal. The suit is for streedhanam including the price of gold ornaments and bronze vessels. Plaintiff is the sister of defendants 1 and 2. The third defendant is their mother. Plaintiff was married in the year 1088 to one Devaseya Devaseya. It is alleged in the plaint that at the time of her marriage, her father, Cheriath, promised to give her 6000 Chakrams as streedhanam, gold ornaments for six sovereigns and bronze vessels of the weight of 450 Palams but that these were not given to her. The father died intestate in the year 1112. Plaint schedule properties belonged to him. According to the plaintiff, the streedhanam due to her including the value of the ornaments and bronze vessels is a charge on the plaint schedule properties and she is entitled to realise the same from the properties. Demand was made by the plaintiff on 2.1.1121 by means of a registered notice and the suit

was filed on 29.1.1121.

2. The first defendant filed separate written statement in the case while defendants2 and 3 filed a joint written statement. The main contentions of the defendants were that the suit was not maintainable and that it was barred by limitation. It was admitted that there was an agreement at the time of the marriage of the plaintiff to give her 6000 Chakrams as streedhanam; but it was contended that the amount was paid to the plaintiff's father-in-law even before the date of the marriage. The alleged agreement to give ornaments and bronze vessels was denied; but it was contended that the plaintiff was in fact given some ornaments at the time of her marriage and that some ornaments were given for her first-born child. It was also contended that the plaintiff was given some bronze vessels both by her father and, after the death of the father, by the defendants. In the written statement filed by defendants 2 and 3 it was contended that, after the death of the plaintiff's father, his properties were partitioned between the defendants in the year 1116, that it was provided in the partition deed that first defendant should pay Rs. 50/- to the plaintiff over and above the streedhanam paid to her and that, in any case, defendants 2 and 3 and their share of the plaint schedule properties were not liable for any portion of the plaint claim. The plaintiff filed a replication traversing the contentions raised by the defendants and re-affirming the allegations in the plaint. It was also alleged that the partition deed mentioned in the written statement of defendants 2 and 3 was not binding on the plaintiff and that it was executed without her knowledge and consent.

3. Of the nine issues raised in case issues Nos.1, 2 and 6 were tried as preliminary issues by the trial court. Issue No.1 relates to the question whether the suit is maintainable. Issue No.2 is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The 6th issue relates to the question whether the amount claimed in the plaint is a charge on the plaint schedule properties.

4. The first court held that the Christian Succession Act, II of 1092 (Travancore), did not apply to the case since the plaintiff's marriage took place before the date of that Act. it was, therefore, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim the benefit of S.28 of the Act which provides that streedhanam promised but not paid by the intestate will be a charge on his properties. It was also held that the suit, filed more than three years after the date of the promise to pay streedhanam, was barred by limitation. The suit was accordingly dismissed with costs.

5. In appeal filed by the plaintiff the District Court disagreed with the view of the trial court that the Christian Succession Act did not apply to the case. That court held that since the plaintiff's father died after 12.5.1092, the date on which the Christian Succession Act came into force, that Act applied to the case although the plaintiff's marriage took place before the date of the Act. But it was held that si