The main legal point established in the judgment is the constitutionality of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, and its compliance with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

1. This suit relates to the Kaipancheri Vishnu Temple situated in the Nedumpura Village, a village in the Cochin State portion of the Travancore-Cochin State. The plaintiff is the karnavan of the Pazhur Mana, Panayalikara, to which according to him the temple and its properties were entrusted in 1041 M.E. in pursuance of a Theettooram of His Highness the Maharaja of Cochin.

2. The defendant is the Cochin Devaswom Board, Trichur and the immediate cause of the suit is the decision of the Board under S. 114 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, to the effect that the temple is an 'institution' as defined in Part II of that Act. After some discussion at the Bar the issues for decision as far as this court is concerned were settled as follows:

1. Does the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, offend Art. 14 of the Constitution?

2. Is the Devaswom Board a local or other authority within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution?

3. Is the right of the plaintiff to be an Ooralan "Property" within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution?

4. Do Ss. 63 and 64 of the Act offend Arts. 14,15(1),19(1)(f) & (g) and 26 of the Constitution?

5. Does S. 66(vi) of the Act offend Arts. 19, 26 and 254 of the Constitution?

6. If either S. 63 or S. 66(vi) of the Act is ultra vires of the Constitution, will that invalidate the entire Act or the constitution of the present Devaswom Board?

7. Does S. 61(6) of the Act offend Art. 14 of the Constitution in view of S. 2(b) of the Act which exempts institutions belonging to and under the sole management of a single family?

8. Are Ss. 79, 81, 83, 84 and 86 ultra vires of the Constitution or alternatively will exercise of supervision by the Board before an enquiry and a finding of 'proved mismanagement' as provided in S. 36 of the Act offend Art. 14 of the Constitution?

9. Does S. 114 of the Act offend Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution? Are the notification and order of the Board dated 12.1.1951 invalid and inoperative?

3. Issue No. 1. Does the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, offend Art. 14 of the Constitution?

This issue relates to the validity of the Act as a whole and not of any specific section or sections of the Act. The contention is that it singles out the followers of the Hindu faith for special control and restrictions and thus violates Art. 14 of the Constitution which provides that :

"The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India".

4. A similar contention was argued before the High Court of Madras and negatived by that Court in A.I.R. 1952 Madras 613. The judgment stated the principles to be borne in mind when applying Art. 14 in the words of Fazl Ali, J. in A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 315:

"(1) The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be assumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds.

(2) The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class.

(3) The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment of circumstances in the same position, and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment.

(4) The principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes.

(5) Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere production of inequality is not enough.

(6) If a law deals equally with members of a well defined clas