The judgment clarified that there is no presumption that a business started by the father is a joint family business under Hindu law, and joint family interest in a contract must be supported by evidence.

1. This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Election Tribunal, Quilon, declaring the election of the appellant to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Travancore-Cochin from the Shencottah Constituency void on the ground that he was disqualified to stand for election under S.7(d) read with S.9(2) of Act No. XLIII of 1951.

2. Under S.7(d), a person is disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly of a State, if he is interested in any contract for the supply of goods or for the execution of any works for the Government of the State. S.9(2) declares that if any such contract has been entered into by or on behalf of a Hindu undivided family, every member thereof shall be subject to the disqualification mentioned in S.7(d); but that if the contract has been entered into by a member of an undivided family carrying on a separate business in the course of such business, other members of the family having no share or interest in that business shall not be disqualified under S.7(d).

3. The contract in the present case was for felling trees in a Government forest and transporting them for delivery at the places specified therein. There is now no dispute that the contract is one that falls within S.7(d) of the Act. The point in controversy is simply whether the contract with the Government was entered into on behalf of the joint family, of which the appellant is a member. The agreement stands in the name of one Kuppuswami Karayalar, and the allegations in the petition are that he is a mere namelender for one Krishnaswami Karayalar, who is the manager of a joint family consisting of himself and his sons, the appellant being one of them and that he entered into the contract in question on behalf of and for the benefit of the joint family. The case of the appellant, on the other hand, is that Kuppuswami whose name appears in the contract was the person solely entitled to the benefits thereof, that he was not a name-lender for Krishnaswami Karayalar, and that further neither he nor the joint family had any interest in the contract. Certain other pleas were also put forward by him, but they are not now material.

The following issues were framed on the above contentions:

"(2) Is the said joint family the owner of the right and benefits of the contract for the felling and removal of timber from Coupe No. 4, Nedumangad Taluq, entered into with the Forest Department, Travancore-Cochin State? Has the joint family any interest in the said contract?

(3) Is Mr. Kuppuswamy Karayalar whose name appears as the contractor only a name-lender for the joint Hindu family of which the respondent is a member?"

4. On issue 3, the Tribunal found that Krishnaswami Karayalar was the real contracting party and that Kuppuswami was a benamidar for him, and on issue 2, that the contract was entered into on behalf of the joint family, of which the appellant was a member. On these findings, it held that the appellant was disqualified under S.7(d) read with S.9(2), and declared his election void. The appellant questions the correctness of this order firstly on the ground that the finding that Kuppuswami is a benamidar for Krishnaswami Karayalar is not warranted by the evidence, and secondly on the ground that the finding that Krishnaswami entered into the contract on behalf of the joint family is based on a mistake of law, and is unsustainable.

5. On the first question Mr. Kumaramangalam for the appellant admits that there is evidence in support of the conclusion that Kuppuswami was a benamidar for Krishnaswami, but contends that it is meagre and worthless. The question whether a person is a benamidar or not is purely one of fact and a finding thereon cannot be interfered with in special appeal, if there is evidence on which it could be beased. We must, therefore, accept the finding of the Tribunal that it was Krishnaswami, the father of the appellant who was the real contracting party to the agreement with the Governme