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1954 Supreme(Ker) 122

Judges : KOSHI,SUBRAMONIA IYER,KUMARA PILLAI
Thommas - Appellant
Versus
Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. - Respondent
Case No : C. R. P. No. 215 of 1953
Decided On : 08/16/1954
Advocates Appeared :
M. Ramanatha Pillai; For Petitioner K. T. Ninan; For Counter-Petitioner

Important Points

Non-compliance with the rule, without more, would entitle the defendant to have the ex parte decree against him set aside.

Subject

Civil Law - Limitation and Jurisdiction

Act Referred

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : O.9 R.13

Headnote

Limitation - Ex Parte Decree - Travancore Limitation Act (Act VI of 1100) - Art. 482 of the Civil Courts' Guide - Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the provisions of Art. 482 of the Civil Courts' Guide and its interpretation in relation to the application under O. IX R. 13, C.P.C. The court emphasized that the purpose of the provision in note (i) of Art. 482 is to prescribe in terms of days what would constitute 'sufficient time' within the meaning of O. IX R. 6 C.P.C. to enable a defendant to appear and answer to the suit on the day fixed in the summons. Non-compliance with the rule, without more, would entitle the defendant to have the ex parte decree against him set aside. The court also highlighted the peremptory nature of the provisions with respect to time and emphasized that provisions with respect to time are always obligatory unless a power of extending the time is given to the court.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner's application to set aside the ex parte decree against him was dismissed by the courts below as barred by time. The petitioner alleged that he came to have knowledge of the passing of the decree just three days before the presentation of the application. The courts found that the suit summons had personally been served on the petitioner, and the date of the knowledge of the passing of the decree had no relevance for the disposal of the application.

Finding of the Court:

The court affirmed the decision of the lower courts, stating that the application to set aside the ex parte decree failed on the ground of limitation. The court emphasized that the exparte decree passed in contravention of the Article (482) is not an absolute nullity but an irregular exercise of jurisdiction, and the court had inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree in the suit.

Issues: The key issues revolved around the interpretation of Art. 482 of the Civil Courts' Guide, the relevance of the date of knowledge of the passing of the decree, and the applicability of the limitation period under Art. 149 of the Limitation Act (Travancore).

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that non-compliance with the rule, without more, would entitle the defendant to have the ex parte decree against him set aside. The court also highlighted the peremptory nature of the provisions with respect to time and emphasized that provisions with respect to time are always obligatory unless a power of extending the time is given to the court.

Final Decision: The Revision was dismissed, and the petitioner was ordered to pay the counter-petitioner Bank their costs before the Court.

Judgment :-

1. This revision is directed against the concurrent orders of two courts below, dismissing the petitioner's application to set aside the ex parte decree against him, in O.S. 105 of 1124 on the file of the Meenachil District Munsiff's Court, as barred by time. The said decree was passed exparte on 27.12.1948, but the application under O. IX R. 13, C.P.C. to set aside the decree was made only on 30.6.1940. The petitioner alleged that he came to have knowledge of the passing of the decree just three days before the presentation of the application. The Courts below have concurrently found that the suit summons has personally been served on the applicant (the defendant). The date of the knowledge of the passing of the decree had therefore no relevance for the disposal of the application. Where the summons is personally served on the defendant column 3 of Art. 149 of the Travancore Limitation Act (Act VI of 1100) makes the date of the decree the terminus a quo for an application for an order to set aside the decree passed exparte. The petition has therefore rightly been dismissed by the Court below.

2. When this revision came up for disposal before one of us, it was referred to a Full Bench for decision in view of a conflict of opinion regarding the true construction of Art. 482 of the Civil Courts' Guide (Travancore). One of the grounds the petitioner urged to re-open the suit was, that in contravention of note (1) of the said Article the decree was passed before twenty clear days expired after the service of the summons. It is common ground that on 27.12.1948 when the decree was passed seventeen days alone had elapsed after the service of the summons on the defendant, the revision petitioner. It is not clear from the two orders before us whether the view that the petitioner's application was barred by time was on the basis that the terminus a quo for it was the date of the decree or the date when the petitioner got knowledge of the passing of the decree. Be that as it may, both the lower courts have expressed the view that the provision in note (1) of Art. 482 of the Civil Courts' Guide is only directory and mandatory. This is opposed to the view taken in Sulaihaummal v. Noohookannu Lebba, 1952 K.L.T. 665. This decision was, however, not followed by a Division Bench in C.M.A. No. 223 of 1953 (unreported). It is an account of this conflict that the revision was referred for decision by a Full Bench.

3. The decision in 1952 K.L.T. 665 has revised practically all the decisions of the Travancore High Court bearing on the point and also referred to the Cochin decisions upon the analogous provision in R. 237 of the Cochin Civil Rules of Practice. The purport of the decision in 1952 K.L.T. 665 is that what the rule making authorities in the two States did in enacting these provisions was to prescribe in terms of days what would constitute "sufficient time" within the meaning of O. IX R. 6 C.P.C. to enable a defendant to appear and answer to the suit on the day fixed in the summons so that the court may postpone the hearing of the suit to a future date and direct notice of such posting to be given to the defendant without waiting in every case to enquire and decide whether the defendant had sufficient time to enter appearance after the summons was served on him. Note (iii) to Art. 482 of the Civil Courts' Guide makes it amply clear that the purpose of the provision in note (i) is what has been explained in the above decision. Note (iii) states:

"The Bench clerk should note in the day's cause list whether the time allowed in note (i) has elapsed so that the case may not be proceeded with in contravention thereof."

4. When the purpose of the rule is what it has been explained to be in 1952 K.L.T 665 we cannot agree with the view taken in the cases followed in C.M.A. 223 of 1953 (25 T.L.J. 1217 and 29 T.L.J. 1201) that when there is contravention of the rule, to have the decree set aside, the defendant must satisfy that after the se
















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