The main legal point established is that while Article 226 of the Constitution prescribes no period of limitation, delay in seeking redress can result in the dismissal of a writ application.

1. This is an appeal from an order of Subramonia Iyer, J. dismissing a writ application in limine.

2. The appellant was a Superintendent in the Government Secretariate, Trivandrum. By an order dated 2nd August 1949 he was placed under suspension. By a subsequent order of 8th September 1949 he was compulsorily retired from service. The second order stated that he will be given'full pension'. The application before the learned judge was to quash these orders and for a writ of mandamus or such other directions as the Court may think it necessary for reinstating the petitioner to his former office and to reimburse him for the loss of pay and other emoluments, for the period he was kept out of it. The learned judge dismissed the application stating that the second prayer was inadmissible even if the first prayer were to be granted and that in the circumstances of the case the petitioner had no 'cause of action' against the Government with respect to the first prayer. No notice was issued to the Government before the petition was dismissed.

3. Regard being had to the facts of the case, we do not think it necessary to pronounce upon whether the learned judge was right in his view that the appellant had no cause of action or cause for complaint against the two impugned orders. Both the orders were passed before the Constitution of India came into force, but in view of the decision in this Court in Muthuswamy Ayyar Subramonia Ayyar v. State 1949 T.C. L. R. 270 it is not open to us to hold that we cannot review these orders as they were passed during the Pre-Constitution days. In 1949 T. C. L. R. 270 the Full Bench held (Govinda Menon, J. doubting) that 'on proper cause being shown this Court will issue any one of the prerogative writs which a Court of record and a Superior Court will issue elsewhere under similar circumstances'. Notwithstanding this decision we do not feel persuaded to go into the merits of the appellant's case; our reason being that it is after inordinate delay that the appellant approached this Court for the redress of his grievances.

4. The Writ Petition was filed before this Court only on 29th January, 1953, when more than three years and four months had elapsed after the order for compulsory retirement was passed. The appellant's counsel sought to get over the difficulty by inviting our attention to two applications the appellant made before the Government for reconsideration of their orders, one on 12th April 1951 and the other on 16th April 1952. The petition of 12th April 1951 was dismissed on 21st May 1951 and the second petition of 16th April 1952 was dismissed on 20th December 1952. The Writ Petition was, as mentioned, filed on 29th January 1953, more than a month after the dismissal of the petition dated 16th April 1952. So far as this court is concerned the proper date to reckon whether there was delay or not is the date of the order terminating the appellant's services (8th September 1949). It was not any statutory remedy that the appellant was pursuing by means of the afore-mentioned petitions. Assuming without deciding, that the time taken by the Government for reconsideration can be taken into account, we cannot find any justification for making allowance for the period during which the second reconsideration petition was pending. To hold otherwise would be to allow an aggrieved person in the position of the appellant to put off his application to the High Court for relief indefinitely. The first petition for reconsideration was dismissed on 21st May 1951 and it was more than one year and eight months after that this court was moved.

5. Article 226 of the Constitution prescribes no period of limitation, but ordinarily no application under it will be entertained unless it is made soon after the right sought to be protected is infringed. No relief is

ordinarily granted to a person who does not seek his remedy under the said Article with due diligence. See Muthiah Chettiar v. 1.T. Comr., A.I.R. 19