The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the 12 years' rule under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code in the context of the execution of a decree.

1. The assignee-decree-holder in O. S. No. 923 of 1108 on the file of the Perumbavoor District Munsiffs Court has preferred this appeal against the order of the execution court dated 9-12-1123 that the execution application filed by him on 30-12-1121 was barred by the 12 pears' rule enacted in Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code (Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Travancore) since repealed). The Division Bench before which the appeal first came up for hearing referred it for disposal by a Full Bench as it raised some nice questions relating to the law of execution. Before the reference, and as a preliminary thereto, certain findings were called for from the execution court and the order of reference was made after the findings were received in this Court.

2. The facts so far as they are relevant for the purpose of the appeal are as follows:

The decree under execution is one charged on immovable properties and it was passed by the Perumbavoor District Munsiff's Court on 21-2-1109. At that time the properties directed to be sold thereunder were within the jurisdiction of the Perumbavoor Court, but before the first execution application was made the territorial jurisdiction over the local area where these properties are situate happened to be transferred to the Parur District Munsiffs Court. The first execution petition was filed before the Perumbavoor Court on 25-7-1109. It asked for several reliefs and also contained a request to send the records to the Parur Court for execution. The Court however only sent a copy of the decree and the certificate of non-satisfaction to the Parur Court. Afterwards the Perumbavoor Court "struck off" the execution case stating that a copy of the decree and the certificate had been sent to the Parur Court. After these papers reached Parur the decree-holder applied to the Court there to send the execution case back to the Perumbavoor Court as certain amounts attached before judgment which amounts were also attached in other cases, were sought to be brought into that court for rateable distribution. The transfer was accordingly made and the execution case thereafter remained on the file of the Perumbavoor Court till 28-4-1119. It is common ground that on that date the decree was a live one. After the retransfer the decree-holder had made more than one execution application to the Perumbavoor Court.

3. The next execution petition in the case was made on 24-10-1121 before the Parur Court and that was by the assignee-decree-holder, the present appellant. The original decree-holder expressly agreed to the recognition of the transfer and the execution asked for being allowed in favour of the appellant. When the petition was taken up for ordering notice to the judgment-debtor it was thought that the decree was attached in execution of two decrees and the Court therefore ordered notices to be issued to the decree-holders in those cases as well. The appellant tried to satisfy the court that neither of those attachments did proceed in execution of any decree obtained against the decree-holder but that both the attachments were in relation to decrees passed against the judgment-debtor. The court was however not satisfied about that position and passed a further order on 9-12-1121 which ran thus: "Issue Notice to the attaching decree-holders also, returnable on 14-1-1122. Pay deficit process. To 15-12-1121. The appellant did not comply with the order and on the appointed day the court "struck off" the execution application.

4. This was followed by the execution petition from the order dismissing which the present appeal has been brought. It has been mentioned already that this application was filed on 30-12-1121. On the face of it, it was barred by the 12 years' rule. Ten months and nine days had elapsed after the expiration of 12 years from the date of the passing of the decree. When notice was issued on the petition it was a purchaser of the secured properties that raised objection to th