The main legal point established in the judgment is that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment, as mentioned in Section 12 of the Limitation Act, is the time occupied in obtaining the copy which accompanies the memorandum of appeal and not an ideal lesser period which might have been occupied if the application for copy had been filed at some other date.

1. Plaintiff -1st respondent in the court below is the revision petitioner. The suit which is one for redemption of a mortgage was decreed on 8-2-1951. On the application of the 1st defendant for copies of the judgment and decree for the purpose of filing an appeal from the decree the copy of the decree was given to him on 14-3-1951 and the printed copy of the judgment was given on 20-6-1951. He had applied for an urgent copy of the judgment on 17-2-1951, and he got the same on 19-3-1951. He filed the appeal on 26-6-1951, producing the printed copy of the judgment obtained on 20-6-1951 and the copy of the decree. If the period of limitation for filing the appeal is calculated on the basis of the copy of the judgment produced along with the appeal the appeal would be within time. But if time is calculated on the basis of the copy of the judgment obtained by the first defendant on 19-3-1951 the appeal would be out of time. Plaintiff-first respondent contended in the court below that the period of limitation should be calculated on the basis of the copy of the judgment obtained by the first defendant on 19-3-1951 and that, therefore, the appeal was barred by limitation. He also contended that the Vakkalath filed on behalf of the first defendant-appellant in the court below was defective. The court below repelled both these contentions by its order dated 25-6-1952. The revision petition is from that order.

2. The contention regarding the defects in the vakkalath was not pressed before me. The point that was urged was that the Court below went wrong in holding that the appeal was not barred by limitation. Relying on a decision of the Lahore High Court in Mathela v. Sher Mohammad (A. I. R. 1935 Lahore 682) learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment mentioned in section 12 of the Limitation Act is not necessarily the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the judgment produced along with the appeal and that it is the shortest time during which a copy of judgment could have been obtained. In that case Dalip Singh, J. dissented from the Full Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Thirumala Reddi v. Anavema Reddi (A.I.R.1934 Madras 306) and held that the time requisite for obtaining a copy is the shortest time during which a copy could have been obtained and that it has nothing to do with the time taken by the appellant in obtaining the copy which he chooses to produce along with the memorandum of appeal. The learned judge observed thus:

"I am unable to see why the word 'a' should be read as 'the' copy of the decree filed with the memorandum of appeal To the contrary in 49 Calcutta 999 - (Pramatha Nath Roy V. William Arther Lee), a Privy Council ruling, it was pointed out that the words 'time requisite' mean simply the time required by the appellant to obtain a copy of the decree assuming that he acted with reasonable promptitude and diligence."

The learned judge, therefore, held that since the appellant had obtained another copy of the decree on an earlier date the period of limitation should be calculated on the basis of that copy. Becket, J. agreed with this view. With great respect I find myself unable to agree with this view. I prefer to accept the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in A.I.R. 1934 Madras 306. In that case it was held that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment is the time occupied in obtaining the copy which accompanies the memorandum of appeal and not an ideal lesser period which might have been occupied if the application for copy had been filed at some other date. Jackson J. observed thus:

"The only concern of the court is the time occupied in obtaining the copy which is filed with the appeal; not the time which might have been occupied in obtaining some ether copy which is not filed with the appeal,"

Reliance was placed by the respondent in that case on the following observation of the Privy Co