The main legal point established is the principle of implied surrender under section 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, which determines the termination of a lease when a new relationship arises regarding the same subject matter.

1. The plaintiff in a suit for redemption of a possessory mortgage and puravaippa having been denied the relief for khas possession in the decrees granted to him by the courts below has preferred this second appeal.

2. The facts are few and simple. Kidangassery Tharananellur Illom the jenmi leased on verumpattom an item of land to Kurunhikattil Manickan and another item to Manali Makkotha. During the subsistence of these leases the lessor in the year 1080 executed an usufructuary mortgage (Ex. A) and in 1092 a purakadam deed (Ex. E) to Manickan's son and heir, Raman. These are the possessory mortgage and purakadam which form the basis of the suit. In 1081 Makkotha attorned to Raman. After obtaining the purakadam Raman apportioned an amount of Rs. 50/- from out of the mortgage money of Rs. 200/- and a further advance Rs. 50/- for the puramkadam upon the item in Makkotha's possession as lessee and assigned that part of his rights to Makkotha (Ex. G). The illom assigned its right over both the items to the plaintiff in 1120. (Ex. B). Meanwhile the rights of Makkotha had by several transfers and transmissions details whereof are unnecessary for the case, devolved upon Kallata Kochuraman. Kochuraman surrendered the property to the plaintiff. Having thus obtained possession of one of the items on payment of the proportionate part of the mortgage and purakadam amounts he brought the suit for redemption of the other item on payment of the balance amount and claiming khas possession though the mortgagee was not inducted into possession along with the mortgage on the allegation that the antecedent lease terminated with the mortgage whereafter the relationship between the parties was merely one of mortgagor and mortgagee and not of lessor and lessee.

3. The defence was that the lease did not terminate with but survived the mortgage whose redemption would have the effect of only freeing the property from the encumbrance thereunder leaving the lessee in possession thereof as such. The question that arose for consideration therefore was as regards the effect of the mortgage transaction upon the preexisting lease. Both the courts below concurred in the conclusion which was against the plaintiff.

4. The first question in this second appeal is as regards its maintainability in the face of the concurrent finding recorded by the courts below. If the finding be one of fact and there is evidence to support it, the same cannot be interfered with in second appeal. Here the finding recorded relates to the construction of the two documents of mortgage and puramkadam. The word 'construction' connotes and includes both the meaning of words as also their legal effect, the former of which may no doubt be a question of fact. In Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Go. (1891) 1 Q. B. 79) Lord Justice Lindley said:

"The expression construction as applied to a document, at all events as used by English lawyers, includes two things: first, the meaning of the words and secondly their legal effect, or the effect which is to be given to them. The meaning of the' words I take to be a question of fact in all cases whether we deal with a poem or a legal document. The effect of thewords is a question of law."

The latter is a question of law. When a question of construction in the latter aspect arises not as regards a document which forms merely a piece of evidence in the case but constitutes the cause of action or the root of title of the plaintiff a second appeal for its consideration is competent. The following extract from the judgment of the Privy Council in Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Baksh (57 Indian appeals 86=I. L.R. 11 Lahore 1199=1930 Privy Council 91) is inescapable as it has said perhaps the last word on the subject:

"Section 100 of the present Civil Procedure Code has replaced S. 584, Civil Procedure Code of 1882. These sections are substantially the same in their terms and have often been considered by the Board and the different High Courts in