A Hindu can succeed to the estate of an intestate Christian under the Christian Succession Act, and religion or faith is not a qualification for, or bar to, succession under that section or any other section of the Christian Succession Act.

1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for setting aside a mortgage deed and recovering possession of the property comprised in the said deed with mesne profits. Plaintiff, whose suit was dismissed by the trial court and whose appeal to the District Court was also unsuccessful, is the appellant. He is a Hindu Nadar. He had a brother, Saminathan, who died intestate in 1108 and who was a Christian at the time of his death. The plaint property belonged to the said Saminathan. After Saminathan's death his wife, Paranchothi, mortgaged the plaint property to the defendant for 2100 Fanams on 19.1.1112 M.E. Ext. I is the mortgage deed. Subsequent to the execution of Ext. I, Paranchothi also died in 1115. In 1116, plaintiff brought the suit, which was given rise to this second appeal, for setting aside Ext. I and recovering possession of the plaint property with mesne profits at the rate of 5 kottas of paddy per year. His case was that he was Saminathan's heir and the only person entitled to the property after Saminathan's death, that Paranchothi was not Saminathan's legally wedded wife, that she had therefore no right to the plaint property and was not competent to execute the mortgage deed, and that the said deed was also not supported by consideration and necessity. The defendant contended that Paranchothi was Saminathan's lawfully wedded wife, that she was the only person entitled to his property after his death, that the plaintiff was only the son of Saminathan's mother and not the son of his father and was not entitled to succeed to the property left by Saminathan, and that the mortgage deed was also supported by consideration and necessity. By its judgment dated 24.7.1120 (7th March 1945), the trial court at first found that Paranchothi was the legally wedded wife of Saminathan, that Saminathan and the plaintiff were brothers, being the sons of the same father and mother, that under the Christian Succession Act, II of 1092, the plaintiff was Saminathan's heir and obtained absolutely one-half of his estate immediately on his death and the other half on the death of Paranchothi who had a life-estate over that half under the same Act, and that Ext. I was therefore invalid from its very inception as regards one-half of the plaint property and invalid as regards the other half from the date of Paranchothi's death, 30.11.1115. Agreeably to these findings it gave a decree to the plaintiff on 24th Kumbhom 1120 setting aside one half of the mortgage from the date of its execution and the other half from 30.11.1115 and allowing the plaintiff to recover possession of the whole property. Past mesne profits in respect of one-half of the property was allowed to be recovered only from 30.11.1115 and in respect of the other half it was allowed to be recovered for a period of three years before the date of suit. From the decree of 24.7.1120 the defendant preferred an appeal to the Nagercoil District Court. That Court confirmed the findings that the plaintiff was Saminathan's brother and Paranchothi was his legally wedded wife. But it doubted whether a Hindu could succeed under the Christian Succession Act, II of 1092, to his brother who had become a convert to Christianity and remanded the suit to the trial court for a fresh disposal after re-considering the questions whether the plaintiff, who is a Hindu, can succeed to the estate of the deceased Saminathan under the Christian Succession Act of 1092 and whether the plaint mortgage was supported by consideration and necessity. After the remand, on 21.5.1124 (4th January 1949) the trial court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff, being a Hindu, could not succeed to the estate of Saminathan under the Christian Succession Act and that Ext. I was supported by consideration and necessity. The appeal which the plaintiff filed against the trial court's second decree was dismissed by the lower appellate court on the 18th January 1950 on the ground that the plaintiff had no right