The main legal point established in the judgment is that the lack of Presidential sanction rendered section 3 of the Public Safety Measures Act 1950 void, leading to the discharge of the accused.

1. By O.P. No. 93 of 1952 accused Nos.1 and 2 in C.C. No. 156 of 1950 of the Division First Class Magistrate's Court, Kottayam, moved this Court for a withdrawal of the said case to this Court under Art. 228 of the Constitution on the ground that the case involved substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The prayer was allowed by Vithayathil, J. and the facts of the case and the questions that arise for consideration are set out as follows in his order dated the 4th August 1953:

"This is a petition under Art. 228 of the Constitution of India for withdrawing to this Court Calendar Case No. 256 of 1950 on the file of the Division First Class Magistrate's Court, Kottayam, on the ground that case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The charges against the petitioners are under Sections 14 and 73 of Act V of 1950. Section 14 of the Act makes it an offence to contravene any order notified by Government under section 3 of the Act relating to production or manufacture of essential articles. Orders dated 21.11.1942 and 1.2.1943 are the notified orders alleged to have been contravened by the accused. The notification dated 21.11.1942 prohibits the transportation of paddy and rice between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. except under a permit issued by officers authorised in that behalf. Notification dated 1.2.1943 prohibits the owner, manager or other person in charge of a rice mill from managing the business of hulling rice. The petitioner's case is that this notification is in violation of the fundamental right conferred under Art. 19[1] [g] of the Constitution. It is also contended that it is in violation of Art. 14 inasmuch as there is no such restriction in the erstwhile Cochin area. So far as the notification dated 21.11.1942 is concerned, it is contended that section 3 of the Public Safety Measures Act under which it was issued is in conflict with Art. 301 and 304 of the Constitution. It is not disputed that the questions raised in this case are substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and that the determination of these questions is necessary for the disposal of the case.

2. I therefore withdraw the case of this Court under Art. 228 of the Constitution".

2. The notifications referred to in the order read as follows:-"R.O.C.No. 3211/42/C.S. dated the 21st November 1942.

In exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 81 of the Defence of Travancore Rules, the Government of High Highness the Maharaja are pleased to prohibit the transportation of paddy and rice in the State between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. except under a permit issued by -

(1) The Division Peishkar concerned or such other officer authorised by him in the case of transport within the same District; or

(2) the Food Grains Controller in the case of transports from one District to another". "R.O.C.No. 24771/42/C.F.S. dated the 1st February 1943.

In exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 81 of the Defence of Travancore Rules, the Government of His Highness the Maharaja hereby order that with effect from the 15th February 1943, no owner, manager or other person in charge of a Rice Mill shall engage in the business of hulling of rice in any part of the State".

They were in force on the date of the alleged offence, namely, 24.4.1950, by virtue of section 73 of the Travancore-Cochin Public Safety Measures Act, 1950, which provides:

"(1) The enactments mentioned in the Second Schedule are hereby repealed.

(2) All orders made or deemed to be made under the enactments referred to in sub-section (1), and in force immediately prior to the commencement of this Act shall continue in force and be deemed to have been made and shall have effect as if they have been made under this Act, and all appointments made, licenses or permits granted and directions issued under any such order and in force immediately before such commencement shall likewise continue in force and be deemed to be made,