The right of appeal is a substantive right which has to be conferred by the statute and it cannot be said that such a right is conferred by sub-section 6 of section 7 or Rule 18. Neither can it be said that section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers such a right on a party to a proceeding under the Nair Act.

1. The counter petitioner in Nair Act Petition No.8/1124 of the District Munsiff's Court, Krishnapuram, is the appellant in this case. The respondent who was her husband filed a petition under Section 5 of the Travancore Nair Act (Act II of 1100) for dissolution of the marriage. The court below passed an ex-parte order on 28-2-1123 dissolving the marriage. On 9-2-1950 the appellant filed a petition to set aside the ex¬parte order on the ground that the notice of the petition for dissolution of marriage was not served on her. The court below held that notice of the petition was properly served on the appellant and dismissed her petition. The appeal is from that order.

2. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that no appeal lies from the order of the court below. Sub-section 4 of Section 7 of the Nair Act provides for appeal from a decision of the District Munsiff relating to dissolution of marriage. That sub-section reads thus:

"Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Rules framed by Government under Sub-section 8 of this section, and the provisions of the Limitation Regulation applicable to appeals from original decrees, an appeal shall lie to the High Court at the instance of any aggrieved party from any decision of the District Munsiff relating to the dissolution, or award, or both, except when it relates exclusively to costs; and when an appeal is preferred, court fee shall be levied on the value of the subject-matter in appeal under the Court Fees Regulation:

Provided that no appeal shall lie against a decision of the District Munsiff relating to the dissolution of marriage except on the ground of the decision being contrary to some law or usage having the force of law, or some substantial error or defect in the procedure or investigation of the case, which may have produced error or defect in the decision of the case."

This provision applies only to a decision relating to dissolution of marriage or award of compensation. In the present case the order appealed from does not amount to a decision relating to dissolution of marriage or award of compensation. The order only refused to re-open a decision relating to dissolution of marriage. We are, therefore, of opinion that the order of the court below does not come within the ambit of sub-section 4 of section 7 of the Nair Act.

3. It was, however, argued on behalf of the appellant that even if sub-section 4 of section 7 of the Act would not apply to the case the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals will apply and that, therefore, the appeal is maintainable. Reliance was placed on subsection 6 of section 7 of the Act and section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub section 6 reads thus:

"Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Section or with Rules framed by Government under Sub-section [8] of this Section, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the trial of a suit shall apply to all proceedings under this Section,"

Sub-Section 8 authorises the Government to frame rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Act. Rule 18 of the Rules made by Government is to the following effect:

"Save in so far as it may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Regulation or these Rules, the law relating to the procedure of Civil Courts in the trial of civil suits shall apply to all proceedings in an enquiry."

Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:

"The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction."

Taking together the provisions in sub-section 6 of section 7 of the Nair Act, Rule 18 and section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is contended that the provisions of the Code relating to appeals apply to the order in question and that, therefore, the order is appealable as one passed under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code. In such