Judges : KOSHI,GOVINDA PILLAI,VITHAYATHIL
Velayudhan Thambi - Appellant
Versus
Anandhasubramonia Iyer - Respondent
Case No : A. S. No. 149 of 1123 [T.]
Decided On : 10/31/1952
Advocates Appeared :
N. K. Narayana Pillai; For Appellant T. K. Narayana Pillai; K. N. Narayanan Nair; For Respondents
LIMITATION - Execution Proceedings - Nagendra Nath v. Suresh A.I.R. 1932 P. C. 165, Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd v. Gouri Sharma A.I.R. 1950 Supreme Court 6, Rameswar Prasad v. Parameshwar Prasad, A I.R. 1961 Pat.1 (F. B); Sivaramachari v. Anjaneya A.I.R. 1951 Madras 962 (F. B.) and Pratap Mal v. I.T. Officer A.I.R. 1951 Rajasthan 150 - The court discussed the interpretation of the words 'where there has been an appeal' in clause 2 of col. 3 of Article 182 and the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd v. Gouri Sharma A.I.R. 1950 Supreme Court 6. The court also referred to Lekshmana Perumal Nadar v. Sudalamuthu Nadar 1950 I.L.R. Travancore-Cochin 81 (1950 K.L.T. 312) and emphasized that the appeal from the decree dated 2-4-1106 has a direct or immediate connection with the decree dated 7-8-1104 granting personal relief against Defendant 1. The court also discussed the procedure adopted by the trial court in passing a preliminary decree against the executant of the promissory note and the subsequent final decree. The court held that the appeal in this case gave the decree-holder a fresh starting point of limitation commencing with the date of the decision of the appeal. The court also referred to Ashfaq Husain v. Gauri Sahai (1911) I. L. R. 33 All. 264 and Giri Shenoi v. Navoorkany 0926) 42 T.L.R. 215 to support its view. The court dismissed the appeal with costs.
Fact of the Case:
The appeal arises from execution proceedings to determine whether the execution of a money decree in favor of the father of Respondent 1, of which Respondent 2 obtained an assignment, was barred by limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the appeal in this case gave the decree-holder a fresh starting point of limitation commencing with the date of the decision of the appeal. The court dismissed the appeal with costs.
Issues: The main issue was whether the execution of a money decree in favor of the father of Respondent 1, of which Respondent 2 obtained an assignment, was barred by limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the appeal in this case gave the decree-holder a fresh starting point of limitation commencing with the date of the decision of the appeal.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal with costs.
1. This appeal arises out of execution proceedings. The only question in the appeal was whether or not the execution of a money decree in favour of the father of Respondent 1-of which Respondent 2 obtained an assignment - was barred by limitation. When the appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench that Bench passed the following order: "In view of the importance of the question of law involved in the case this will be placed before a Full Bench for bearing and disposal." The case has accordingly been placed before this Full Bench.
2. The appellants are the legal heirs of defendant I in the suit. He was the karnavan of a Marumakkathayam tarwad. He had executed a promissory note in favour of the father of Respondent I. A suit was brought on foot of it before the Nagercoil District Court in O.S. 105 of 1103 claiming relief both against Defendant 1 and against his tarwad. While defendant 1 remained ex-parte the other members of the tarwad impleaded in the suit as defendants 2 to 8 contested it. Their contention was that the debt was not incurred for tarwad necessity and that the tarwad could not therefore, be made liable for the debt. As defendant 1 did not enter appearance or contest the suit, the plaintiff applied that a preliminary decree be passed against him. This was on the date of the first hearing. The court acceded to that request and gave such a decree on 7-8-1104. That decree stated that it was only a preliminary decree and that the question whether the tarwad was liable for the debt will be decided later on. The final decree was passed on 2-4-1106 and by it the suit was dismissed with costs as against the tarwad. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the final decree to the High Court in A.S.13/1107, but the High Court dismissed the appeal This was on 10-2-1114.
3. The execution petition out of which this appeal arises was filed on 26-5-1121. It sought to enforce the personal relief granted against defendant 1 as per the preliminary decree dated 7-8-1104, Defendant 1 had died while A.S. No. 13 of 1107 was pending in the High Court. His legal heirs who were brought on record in his place raised the objection that the execution was barred by limitation. The execution court overruled the objection basing its decision on Nagendra Nath v. Suresh A.I.R. 1932 P. C. 165. The legal heirs of Defendant 1 have hence preferred this appeal.
4. Mr. N. K. Narayana Pillai, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, conceded before us that in case the period of limitation for execution commenced only from the date of the High Court's decree viz., 10-2-1114, the decision appealed from will have to be confirmed. The decree-holder had made timely applications to keep the decree alive. The point sought to be made out in the appeal, however, was that the relief the Court granted to the plaintiff in the suit which was only as against Defendant 1 was granted so early as 7-8-1104 and that date furnished the starting point for limitation for execution as against Defendant 1 or his legal heirs. It was contended that the final decree the trial court passed on 2-4-1106 or the High Court's decree dated 10-2-1114 had not anything to do with the personal relief granted against Defendant 1 as per the decree, (preliminary) dated 7-8-1104. According to counsel that was a complete and self contained decree and also final so far as Defendant 1 was concerned. The argument raised hence was that the applicatory provision of the Limitation Act was clause 1 in column 3 of Article 182 (Clause 1 in Col. 3 of Article 166, Travancore Limitation Act). When read along with the words occurring in columns 1 and 2, the said clause provides that the time for an application for the execution of a decree shall be three years from the date of the decree.
5. The lower court's view which Respondent 2 sought to maintain before us was that clause 2 in column 3 of Article 182 applied to the case. Clause 2 so far as relevant together with the words in colu
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