1952 Supreme(Ker) 115
Judges : KOSHI,GOVINDA PILLAI,JOSEPH VITHAYATHIL
Ittiavirah Appren - Appellant
Versus
State and others - Respondent
Case No : Crl. R. P. No. 119 of 1951
Decided On : 12/12/1952
Advocates Appeared :
P. I. Simon; For Petitioner M. N. Govinda Panicker; For Counter Petitioner M. N. Parameswaran Pillai; For State
The main legal point established in the judgment is the necessity of government sanction for prosecuting a public servant under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the court's role in determining the necessity of government sanction based on the allegations in the complaint.
Headnote:
Sanction of Government - Public Servant - Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - H.H.B. Gill v. The King (A.1.R.1948 P. C 128), Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor AIR 1939 F. C. 43 - The judgment discusses the necessity of government sanction for prosecuting a public servant under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It emphasizes the need for a perceptible connection between the act and the discharge of official duty, and the court's role in determining the necessity of government sanction based on the allegations in the complaint.
Fact of the Case:
The court considered the dismissal of a complaint against accused 2 and 4, and the necessity of government sanction for prosecuting a public servant under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that government sanction is necessary for prosecuting a public servant under Section 197, and emphasized the need for a perceptible connection between the act and the discharge of official duty.
Issues: The issues revolved around the necessity of government sanction for prosecuting a public servant under Section 197, and the court's role in determining the necessity of government sanction based on the allegations in the complaint.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the necessity of government sanction for prosecuting a public servant under Section 197 should be determined based on the allegations in the complaint, and emphasized the need for a perceptible connection between the act and the discharge of official duty.
Final Decision: The Magistrate's order dismissing the complaint was set aside, and the court directed the Magistrate to readmit the complaint to his file and hold the trial with respect to all the charges levelled against the accused in the case and dispose of the case according to law.
Govinda Pillai, J.
1. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the dismissal of the complaint against accused 2 and 4 was wrong. I am also of the view that for the acts of violence alleged to have been committed by the Inspector on the complainant at night in the Police-lock-up on the date of arrest, no sanction of Government is necessary to prosecute him. But for what the Inspector was stated to have done i. e. for the assault on the complainant on the public road after his arrest and while he was being taken to the Police Station in the motor vehicle, I am for holding that sanction of Government is necessary to prosecute him. The present complainant was the accused in a cognizable case and in the course of investigation he was arrested and taken to the Police-lock-up. In this the Inspector was only acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. In case of resistance on the part of the person arrested or if he refuses to accompany the Inspector to the Police Station after arrest, the Inspector would be entitled to use reasonable force on him to secure his custody and to put him in a safe place in the lock-up. It might be that the force used under the circumstances was more than what actually required. The test in such cases whether sanction is required or not, as pointed in H.H.B. Gill v. The King (A.1.R.1948 P. C 128), is whether the public officer, if challenged, can reasonably claim, that what he does, he does in virtue of his office.
2. Assuming that all that the complainant mentioned in this case are true, the Inspector could say that while taking the arrested person to the Police Station, he (complainant) refused to accompany him to the station or that he attempted to escape, and that he had to use some physical force on the person of the arrested person to enable him to take the former to the Police Station That is a very reasonable claim, the Inspector can adduce and if so, he cannot be prosecuted without Government sanction. The allegations in the complaint may be false. The claim that can be advanced by the Inspector may also be false. But that does not give the criminal Court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and try it. The aggrieved party can move the Government for sanction. The Government will institute an enquiry through their officers, and as the result of the enquiry the sanction may or may not be given. The party will have however to take the consequence. Otherwise no Government can get on and no officer under Government will be safe.
3. The imperative provision in the section is that no court is to take cognizance of offences said to have been committed by a judge or Magistrate or public servant not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. When the criminal Court which has already accepted a complaint and issued process, is apprised by the officer accused, of the provisions of this section, that court has to apply the test mentioned in AIR 1948 P.C.128, and then drop the proceedings to the extent to which the test can be made to apply. It is not to hold an enquiry and take evidence to ascertain whether the claim advanced by the accused officer is true or not. It will also be against the injunction laid down in S. 197 that no court was to take cognizance of cases of the nature mentioned therein. The formal enquiry will be held by the Government and not by the court. The allegations in the complaint and the claims put forward by the accused are alone to be considered by the court to ascertain whether the acts alleged can be said to be done by the accused officer in his official and not in private capacity (See Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor AIR 1939 F. C. 43). The mere fact that an offence is committed by the public servant when he is in office is not enough to attract the provisions of this section (Vide Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal affairs, Bengal v. Jadu Nat