The main legal point established in the judgment is that the disobedience of a court order is not an offence under S.188 of the Indian Penal Code, and the proper remedy for such disobedience is committal for contempt.

1. The first defendant is the revision petitioner. The revision petition is from an order according sanction to the plaintiff to prosecute the defendants for an offence under S.188 of the Indian Penal Code, i.e., for disobeying an order of injunction issued by the court restraining the defendants from putting up any new building on the suit property. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent to the effect that the order passed by the court below is an appealable order and that, therefore the revision petition is not maintainable. I do not think that there is any substance in the preliminary objection. The order purports to be one relating to an offence coming under S.195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Such an order is not appealable. S.476B provides for appeals from orders under S.476 and S.476-A. What is provided in S.476-B is that:

"Any person on whose application any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court has refused to make a complaint under S.476 or S.476A or against whom such complaint has been made, may appeal to the court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of S.195, sub-s. [3] "

S.476(1) reads thus:

"When any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is, whether on application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in S.195, Sub-s. [1] Cl. [b] or Cl. [c], which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the court, and shall forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction, and may take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or, if the alleged offence is nonbailable may, if it thinks necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to much Magistrate, and may bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate."

S.476-A is to the following effect:

"The power conferred on Civil, Revenue and Criminal Court by S.476, Sub-s. [1], may be exercised in respect of any offence referred to therein and alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any such Court by the court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of S.195, Sub-s. [3], in any case in which such former court has neither made a complaint under S.476 in respect of such offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint; and where the Superior Court makes such complaint, the provision of S.476 shall apply accordingly."

It will thus be seen that S.476(1) and 476-A relate only to offences referred to in Cls.(b) and (c) of Sub-s. (1) of S.195 and that they do not relate to Cl. (a) of that Sub-section. According to the court below the offence in this case is one that comes under Cl. (a). Therefore, S.476(1) and 476-A cannot apply to this case. Since S.476-B applies only to cases coming under S.476 and 476-A, S.476-B also cannot apply to this case, and therefore, the order is not appealable. Reference may be made to Maruda Pillai v. Narayanaswami Pillai and others (A.I.R.1939 Mad. 336), Bajrang Marwari v. Durga Prasad (AIR 1937 Pat. 31) and P.J. Money v. Emperor (AIR 1928 Rang. 296). I, therefore overrule the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent.

2. Coming to the merits of the revision petition it is clear that the order of the court below is wrong. In the first place, I do not think that refusal to comply with an order of injunction issued by a civil court is an offence that comes under S.188 of the Indian Penal Code. That section reads thus:

"Whoever knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with