The judgment emphasizes the need for the appellate court to give proper weight and consideration to the views of the trial judge, the presumption of innocence, and the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt. It also highlights the burden on the accused to establish their defense and the limitations on the appellate court's interference with the trial judge's opinion.

1. These two appeals are presented on behalf of the State by the Public Prosecutor from an order of acquittal made by the learned Sessions Judge of Quilon in S.C. No. 11 of 1124. There were two accused in the case. They are Choni Yohannan and Choni Chacko who are brothers. They were charged with the offence of murder under Ss. 301 and 104 of the Travancore Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge has found the accused not guilty and has acquitted them and it is from this judgment of acquittal that the present appeals are preferred at the instance of the State in respect of each of the accused persons acquitted by the Court below.

2. In the course of arguments a question was raised as to the power of this court to interfere in an appeal from an order of acquittal as in the present case. The learned Public Prosecutor invited the attention of the court to the views expressed in the case reported in 1949 T.L.R. 191, which according to him are inconsistent with the provisions of law, and therefore deserve to be overruled. On going through this decision, we find that the observations made by the learned judge who wrote the judgment in that case which are intended to limit the power of the High Court in an appeal like the present are obiter dicta and as such they have not the force of a decision which needs reconsideration. My learned brother was a party to that decision, but the judgment was written by the judge with whom he was sitting. He did not share the views expressed in the obiter dicta; at the same time he did not feel called upon to express dissent, since the observations were, in his judgment really beside the point and not necessary for arriving at a decision in that case. He is in full agreement with the views that are expressed in this judgment.

3. We may state at the outset that the obiter dicta in the judgement in 1949 T.L.R. 191 which purport to restrict the powers of this court to interfere in appeal from an order of acquittal are based upon an old decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Empress of India v. Murari, I.L.R. 4 All. 148. The views of Straight J. in that decision were adopted by the learned judge who wrote the judgment in 1949 T.L.R. 191. These views did not prevail in Allahabad. They were dissented from and practically overruled by a Full Bench of that Court in the case reported in Emperor v. Sheo Janak Pandey, I.L.R. 56 All. 354. The Full Bench held that although the trial court was in a better position to judge of the credibility of the witnesses examined before it and therefore great weight should be attached to its view, if the appellate court is fully convinced that the conclusion of the trial court was clearly wrong and was contrary to the weight of the evidence, it would be justified in setting aside the order of acquittal. It also held that to arrive at a different conclusion on a question of fact, the appellate court need not necessarily be satisfied that the trial court had been, in the words of Straight, J. "incompetent, stupid or perverse or has come to an unreasonable or distorted conclusion or has obstinately blundered." The question came up for consideration before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 227 when Lord Russel of Killonen adopted a similar view. Ss. 345, 346, 350 of the Travancore Code of Criminal Procedure are similar in wording to the corresponding sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure in India and consequently the views expressed in that decision may well apply to a case like the present arising in this State. The Board observes that the corresponding sections in the Criminal Procedure Code "give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which an order of acquittal was founded and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power unless it be found expressly stated in the Code, but in exercising the power conferred