Koshy, J.

This bail application was referred to the Division Bench, as the learned Single Judge disagreed with some of the observations contained in the Judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported in Jiju Maran v. Narcotic Control Bureau 2004 (2) K.L.T. 690. In paragraph 5 of the above decision it is held as follows:

"5. In S.57 of the Act it is said that when the Public Prosecutor opposes the application accused can be released on bail if the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable ground for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Intention of the Legislature is not to give the Public Prosecutor the power to decide whether bail has to be granted to the accused or not. if S.37 of the Act is interpreted to mean that when the Public Prosecutor says that granting of bail it opposed, the Court cannot grant bail exercising its power of discretion that would have the effect of saying that the Public Prosecutor is the Authority to decide whether bail has to be granted or refused to an accused. Power to decide whether bail has to be granted or refused to an accused is always with the Court. When an application for bail is opposed, as envisaged in S.37 of the Act, it must be by giving reasons for not granting bail. When reasons pointed out by the Public Prosecutor are found to be sustainable, the Court has no power to grant bail unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. If the reasons given for opposing granting of bail are not sustainable or no reasons are given for opposing bail, Court has the discretion to grant bail. In such cases the Court has the discretion to grant bail even if the Court is not satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail."

After considering the above, the learned Single Judge in paragraph 7 of the order held as follows:

"7. I find the contention raised by the learned Public Prosecutor to be justified. In view of the clear language employed in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, I am afraid, I am not able to agree with the conclusion in Jiju Martins case referred above. To me, it appears that, it would be sufficient for the Public Prosecutor to oppose the application for bail on either of the twin grounds—that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty or that he is likely to commit offences again while on bail to justify his opposition to the application for bail."

2. The questions referred by the learned Single Judge read as follows:

"Is the statement of law in Jiju Maran v. Narcotic Control Bureau [2004 (2) K.L.T. 690], that the prosecution is bound to show other reasons in addition to the two reasons mentioned in Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act to justify opposition to a bail application, correct and valid? Does it not go against the mandate of Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act? These questions are raised."

3. We extract Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 below:

"Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. —(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), —

.(a) Every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;

.(b) No person accused of an offence punishable for (offences under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity) shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless—

.(i) The Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

.(ii) Where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reas