On 17-4-2008, the petitioner was convicted by a Court of Session, Thalassery in S.C. No.523 of 2001, he having been found guilty of having committed different offences, including those punishable under Section 307 read with Section 149 I.P.C. On the basis of that conviction, his employer, the first respondent, through its President, the second respondent, issued Ext.P5 taking the view that the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner by the Court of Session would affect the goodwill of the first respondent. The second respondent accordingly placed the petitioner under suspension as per Ext.P3. On 30-8-2008, the committee of the first respondent passed Ext.R1(a) resolution ratifying the action taken by the second respondent President as per Ext.P5.

2. This writ petition was filed on 28-8-2008 challenging Ext.P5 at a point of time before it was ratified as per Ext.R1(a). With the materials on record, as of now, it would be uncharitable to say that Ext.R1

(a) decision was taken to get over any legal infirmity of Ext.P5 because, the issuance of notice on this writ petition, in my considered view, does not, in any manner, impair the right of the committee of the first respondent to ratify Ext.P5 decision, provided, such a procedure could be adopted. In terms of Rule 198(6) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, hereinafter “the Rules”, the power to suspend an employee in anticipation of disciplinary proceedings is with the appointing authority. In terms of Clause 28 of the bye-laws of the first respondent, the committee of the society is the appointing authority of the employees. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner is right in pointing out that the committee of the first respondent is the competent authority to issue an order of suspension. Though support in that regard is sought to be drawn from the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Chandramathi v. Vadakkumpad Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. (1998 (2) KLT Case No.44 – Page 37), I am in complete agreement with the judgment of this Court in Chandrikamma v. Assistant Registrar (2000 (3) KLT 940) rendered by a learned Judge, who was in the quorum of the Bench decision referred to earlier. Learned Counsel for the petitioner made an attempt to say that the decision in Chandrikamma’s case (supra) does not lay down the law correctly and requires re-consideration. Clause 30 of the bye-laws of the first respondent, as extracted in the writ petition, says, among other things, that the President shall have a general control over the affairs of the bank. An authority vested with the general control over the affairs of an establishment has the necessary power to do such things as are necessary for the immediate management of situation in relation to the establishment. If I were to concede that the committee of a society has to meet in all contingencies where an employee has to be placed under suspension, I will have to find room where such an employee could freely continue to be within the establishment even when the fact situation has arisen to place him under suspension. This is because, it is neither conceived nor practically possible for the committee of any society to meet without any prior notice and except in accordance with the terms of the bye-law. This is one of the reasons why the President, being the President of the committee of the society, is conferred with the power to do such things as are necessary to manage the establishment. Such power of the President includes the power to make an order suspending an employee from society in anticipation of ratification by the competent authority, namely the committee, of which the President is essentially a member. Therefore, the decision in Chandrikammas case (supra) cannot be faulted on any principle of law because, all that Rule 198 (6) of the Rules requires is that an order of suspension of an employee can stand only with the seal of approval of the appointing authority, namely t