R. Basant, J.

Claimant before the Tribunal is the appellant before us. His claim for compensation for loss suffered as a result of a motor accident was turned down by the Tribunal on the ground that S.53 of the E.S.I Act bars the claim of the appellant. The accident and injury are not seen disputed. The Tribunal took the view that S.53 of the E.S.I Act as explained in Western India Plywood Ltd. v. Ashokan (1997 (2) KLT 635 (SC)) bars the claim of the appellant/claimant. Admittedly the appellant is receiving disablement benefit under the provisions of the E.S.I Act.

2. The learnedcounsel for the appellant submits that the Tribunal has totally misconstrued the provisions of law in coming to the conclusion that a claim under S.166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is barred by the stipulations of S.53 of the E.S.I Act. The counsel submits that the position has been considered by the Supreme Court in the decision in Reg/. Director E.S.l.C. v. Francis De Costa (1993 Supp. (4) SCC 100). We extract the relevant para.44 below:

"Para.44: The next contention that the Motor Vehicles Act provides the remedy for damages for an accident resulting in death of an injured person and that, therefore, the remedy under the Act cannot be availed of lacks force or substance. The general law of tort or special law in Motor Vehicles Act or Workmens Compensation Act may provide a remedy for damages. The coverage of insurance under the Act in an insured employment is in addition to but not in substitution of the above remedies and cannot on that account be denied to the employee. In K. Bharathi Devi v. G.I.C.I. the contention that the deceased contracted life insurance and due to death in air accident the appellant received compensation and the same would be set off and no double advantage of damages under carriage by Air Act be given was negatived."

The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the decision in Western India Plywood Ltd. v. Ashokan (supra) by a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court can be understood only in the light of the facts stated, where an employee after having claimed and obtained benefits under the E.S.I Act had staked a claim for compensation by filing a suit against his employer himself. It was held that S.53 of the E.S.I Act is a clear answer to the claim for compensation for employment injury staked against the employer by the plaintiff who had already enjoyed benefits under the E.S.I Act.

3. We are persuaded to agree that the decision in Reg/. Director E.S.I.C v. Francis De Costa (supra) covers the specific issue raised in this case. Claim is raised against a stranger to the contract of employment for compensation on the basis of negligence for causing the accident. The claim is not for compensation for employment injury and in these circumstances the observations in para.44 of Reg/. Director E.S.I.C v. Francis De Costa must be preferred. Following the dictum therein we accept that a claim for compensation in tort against a stranger can coexist with a claim for benefits under, the E.S.I Act. The use of the words "any person" in S.53 of the E.S.I Act which we extract below cannot take within its sweep the claim in tort against the stranger/ tort feaser under S.166 of the M.V. Act for compensation for the loss suffered in a motor accident caused by negligence.

"Bar against receiving or recovery of compensation or damages under any other law:- An insured person or his dependents shall not be entitled to receive or recover, whether from the employer of the insured person or from any other person, any compensation or damages under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise, in respect of an employment injury sustained by the insured person as an employee under this Act. (emphasis supplied)

The expression "any other person" in S.53 can take within its sweep only such other person who is sought to be made liable, under or on the basis of the contract of employm