A short but a question of moment arises for consideration in the revision, which is filed against an order passed by the learned Munsiff, Punalur, holding that the decree which was challenged as barred by limitation is executable. The judgment debtor in E.P.No.14/2005 in O.S.No.184/1986, who suffered that adverse order is the revision petitioner, and the decree holder, the respondent.

2. Suit was one for recovery of possession and it was decreed on 14.2.1990. The decree was challenged by the judgment debtor with a petition to condone delay before the Sub Court, Kottarakkara as A.S.No.49/1990. Petition moved for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal was dismissed, consequently the appeal also dismissed by judgment dated 18.12.2000. The execution petition was filed before the Munsiff Court, Punalur on 31.1.2005, that is, fourteen years after passing of the decree by that court. The execution of the decree was objected to by the judgment debtor as barred by limitation and the question posed for consideration was whether the period of limitation for executing the decree commenced after the disposal of the appeal or from the date of the decree of the trial court. The learned Munsiff relying on Kamalamma v. Trivandrum Permanent Bank (1986 KLT 1181) concluded that such commencement was only from the date of disposal of the appeal and hence the decree can be executed and the execution petition is maintainable. The order passed by the leaned Munsiff to continue the execution proceedings is challenged as one without jurisdiction, illegal and vitiated by material irregularity.

3. I heard the learned counsel Adv. S. Sreekumar appearing for the revision petitioners and Adv. Subash Syriac, for the 1st respondent. The counsel on both sides invited my attention to the judicial pronouncements rendered on the question whether the dismissal of an appeal from a decree filed with a petition to condone delay consequent to the dismissal of the petition for delay, would extend the period of limitation for execution of the decree till the date of dismissal of such appeal. Since there is no controversy on any facts involved in he case, the question posed for consideration solely rests on a pure question of law as to the effect of a dismissal of an appeal preferred with a petition for condition of delay on dismissal of such delay petition, whether it would amount to confirmation of the decree appealed against.

4. A Full Bench of this Court in Thambi v. Mathew (1987 (2) KLT 848 (F.B.)),after examining the issues involved over that vexed question which continued as a conundrum, over which conflicting views had been expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Chandrika Amma v. Mohammed (1984 KLT 677) and Chakkuvarkey v. Devassy Kathanar (AIR 1962 Kerala 104), had concluded thus:

"A dismissal of an application for condonation of delay results in the dismissal of the appeal which can only be under Rule 11. Section 3 of the Limitation Act also requires an appeal filed after the prescribed period of time to be dismissed subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3A does not render an appeal properly presented under Sub rule (1) a proposed appeal. Sub rule (3) in spite of its language would only mean that no stay of the execution of the decree appealed against shall be granted before the court after hearing the appeal under rule 11 desides to admit the same. An appeal presented out of time is nevertheless an appeal in the eye of law for all practical purposes. An order dismissing the appeal is a decree that can be subject of a second appeal. It is thus clear that the dismissal of an appeal is under Order 41 Rule 11 postulates the drawing up of a decree which can be the subject matter of a further appeal under Order 41 Rule 1 read with Order 42 of CPC. Rule 3A of Order 41 introduced by the CPC Amendment Act, 1976 does not in any way affect this principle. An appeal registered under Rule 9 of Order 41 is t