The court's decision emphasized the importance of compliance with court-fee requirements and the presumption of consideration under Sec. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The appeal arises from a suit for realisation of money. First defendant is the appellant.

2. The suit O.S. 95/1987 before Sub Court, Parur was filed by 1st respondent claiming an amount of Rs. 27250/-with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The claim is based on a promissory note executed by defendants on 9-3-1984 in favour of the plaintiff for an amount of Rs. 20,000/- First defendant admitted the execution of the promissory note, but disclaimed liability contending that the claim is barred by limitation. It was also contended that plaintiff is an unregistered firm and the signatory to the plaint is not the managing partner. He further denied having received any consideration. He contended that Sri P. P. Joseph, who has presented the plaint as the managing partner had arranged supply of cement for construction of a building. On knowing about the inferior quality of the cement, 1st defendant informed Sri Joseph that he did not require cement. It was then that claim was made on the promissory note. Though he had promised to return the promissory note, he did not do so. The 2nd defendant in his written statement raised identical contentions.

3. Plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1 and 1st defendant as D.W. 1. On an appreciation of the oral evidence and the documents on the side of plaintiff, the court below granted a decree for the plaint claim with future interest at 6% and cost of suit. First defendant assails that judgment in this appeal.

4. Heard counsel on both sides.

5. One of the grounds raised in the appeal memorandum is regarding the non-payment of the full court-fee on the date of presentation of the suit. The deficit court-fee was paid only after the period of limitation and the objection is that the suit was barred by limitation by the time the full court-fee was paid. Another ground raised is regarding competency of the signatory; to the plaint to represent the firm, which, according to the appellant, is an unregistered firm. The claim should have been rejected for want of proof of payment of consideration by the plaintiff, according to appellant. On the basis of the grounds raised in the appeal memorandum, the following points require consideration in this appeal:-

1. Whether the claim is barred by limitation?

2. Whether plaintiff is a registered firm and proved to be a partner of the firm ? And

3. Whether the promissory note is supported by consideration and whether payment of consideration has been proved ?

Point No. 1.

6. The promissory note is dated 9-3-1984. The suit was presented on 9-3-1987. The plaint was returned on the same day for representation after curing the defect pointed out, viz., insufficiency of court-fee. Together with the deficit court-fee the plaint was represented on 24-3-1987 and it was thereafter registered as O.S. 95/1987. Learned Counsel for the appellant has raised a contention that the claim has become barred by the date on which the deficit court-fee was paid. Appellant had by that time gained an advantage, the claim having got barred in the meanwhile. In support of this contention counsel relied on the decision in Sukhnandan Prasad v. Baburam Maheswar Lal, AIR 1952 Vindhya Pradesh 12. It was held that the proper way of ascertaining the date of institution is to find out whether while tendering the plaint the plaintiff has done all that he has to do in compliance with Orders 4,5 and 7 of C.P.C. If there is any defect to be removed and the court had granted time and the defect is remedied, the suit would normally be deemed to have been instituted not on the latter day, but the day of the tendering itself because the court in its discretion has, as it were, condoned the delay. This condonation is at the discretion of the court. The court further held that at all events the other party should have the right of urging that the Court's granting time for removal of defect has not affected the advantage he might have gained in the interval. The contention is that a vested right was derived