The main legal point established in the judgment is that the absence of a specific averment about the plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract, as required under S. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, did not bar the suit for specific performance. The court emphasized that the amendment of the plaint to incorporate such an averment, even beyond the period of limitation, did not introduce a new cause of action and did not affect the question of limitation.

Defendant is the appel­lant. He succeeded in the trial court, but lost in appeal. The suit was one for specific performance of an agreement Ext. A1 dated March 20, 1978 to sell the plaint schedule property which belonged to the appellant to one Vasu for a consideration of Rs. 11,815/-. An advance of Rs. 2,000/- was paid on the date of the agreement. The balance considera­tion was to be paid within a period of two and a half months, within which the appellant had to satisfy Vasu about the measurements of the property, and its being unencumbered. Vasu issued notice Ext. A2 on June 2, 1978 calling upon the appellant to furnish him the title deeds of the property, as also the encum­brance certificate, to enable him to get the sale deed prepared and executed. The appellant sent reply Ext. B 10 on June 6, 1978 stating that he had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and that it was Vasu who was the defaulting party, he being not ready to complete the sale. Vasu filed the suit on December 24, 1979 for a decree of specific performance of the agree­ment. I shall refer to Vasu as the plaintiff in the further discussion, for purpose of conve­nience.

2. After reciting the terms of the agree­ment Ext. A1, and about issue of the notice Ext. A2, to which, according to the plaint, there was no reply, the plaint proceeded to state that the defendant-appellant was bound under the agreement Ext. A 1 to convey the property and deliver possession of the same to the plaintiff, and that the suit was necessitated by reason of the appellant's default in per­forming the obligation under Ext. A1. The prayer in the suit was for execution and registered of the deed of sale. It did not contain any alternative prayer, either for damages, or for refund of the advance of Rs. 2,000/- in case specific performance was refused, apart from the usual residuary prayer to grant such other reliefs as the court may deem fit.

3. In his written statement, the appellant denied any default on his part, stating inter alia that he had sent a reply to Vasu on June 6, 1978. According to him, he had offered the documents to the plaintiff, but the latter was evading receipt of the documents. He also contended that the default being on plaintiff's part, he was not entitled to any decree of specific performance, and the suit should be dismissed.

4. The plaint as it was originally filed on October 24, 1979 did not contain any specific averment about the plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract as required under S. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (the Act) read with forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The plaintiff got the plaint amended by filing I. A. No. 646 of 1981 on February 4, 1981 by incorporating an aver­ment to the effect that he was ready to pay the balance consideration to the appellant/def­endant at any time. This amendment was allowed despite opposition subject to pay­ment of costs on August 19, 1981. The nature of the opposition and how it was dealt with will be evident from the order of the Sub­ordinate Judge which was as under :­-

"The plaintiff in this petition filed under O.6, R. 17, CPC now seeks to amend the plaint incorporating an additional plea that he was and is ready and willing to pay the balance of purchase price. The petition is opposed by the respondent-defendant on the ground that in the absence of such a plea, the suit would have failed for the reason of S. 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It might be perhaps true that the absence of a plea in the plaint in the suit of this nature that the plaintiff always was and is willing and ready to perform his part of the contract is fatal. But for that reason alone, the petitioner-plaintiff cannot be denied the relief sought for by amending the plaint suitably. Of course, the suit was in late 1979 and the amendment petition comes up only in February 1981. In that way, the petition is belated for w