Substantial compliance with the provisions of S.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is sufficient, and the intention and conduct of the party concerned should be considered in determining readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Defendants are the appellants and the revision petitioners, Munsiff, Pathanamthitta decreed O.S. No. 628 of 1979 for specific performance of an agreement for sale of immovable property entered into by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff. Second defendant is the person in whose favour the first defendant entered into a subsequent agreement. Appeal was also dismissed and hence the second appeal. There was an order of injunction against the defendants from creating documents and disturbing the possession of the plaintiff. Plaintiff filed I.A.12 of 1980 for taking action against the defendants under O.39 R.2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure for having violated the injunction. I.A. 251 of 1980 was also filed for damages and prosecution. Both the petitions were allowed. Defendants 1 and 2 were ordered to be detained in civil prison for two months each and Rs. 500/- each was awarded as damages. C.M.A. No. 23 of 1982 filed by the defendants was dismissed and hence the Civil Revision Petition.

2. The property agreed to be sold is one obtained on assignment by the first defendant from the State, evidenced by Ext. A2 patta. The alleged agreement is oral and it was on 28-10-1979. Rs. 4,500/- was the sale consideration out of which Rs. 400/- was alleged to have been given as advance. Date of execution of sale was on 9-11-1979. Though the agreement was denied, both the courts concurrently found on evidence that the agreement is true and it was broken by the first defendant. So also the concurrent finding is that plaintiff was always and continued to be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The substantial questions of law on which notice was issued in Second Appeal is whether there is the requisite averment in the plaint for relief under S.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. One other substantial question of law permitted to be raised at the time of arguments was whether the alleged agreement for sale is hit by the provisions of S.23 of the Contract Act.

3. Before entering the substantial questions of law, the learned counsel for the appellants made an attempt to challenge the concurrent decrees on the merits by a contention that the evidence on which the courts below acted was meagre, insufficient and untrustworthy and that the courts below did not take note of the fact that courts are not expected to grant prayers for specific performance based on oral agreements and dependent on oral evidence alone. I do not think that there is any merit in that argument. What the Supreme Court has stated in Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley, (1969) 2 SCWR 347 is only that rarely a decree for specific performance is granted on the basis of an agreement supported solely by oral evidence. That is only as rule of caution and prudence for the guidance of courts in appreciating the contentions and evidence for the purpose of granting or refusing reliefs. That is not a rule of law. An oral agreement is not something prohibited by law. No rule of law says that relief cannot be granted when the agreement and evidence supporting it are only oral and so documents are there to support. Oral agreements can be enforced by court provided the evidence is sufficient to satisfy he conscience of the court. Both the courts below evaluated the pleadings and evidence carefully and found the issue in favour of the plaintiff. No substantial question of law is involved justifying interference. Such an argument is not available also.

4. The argument based on S.23 of the Contract Act is not a contention taken up in the pleadings or at any time before the trial court or the first appellate court. So far as necessary for the purpose of this case, the applicability of S.23 is only in construing whether the agreement is one forbidden by law or if permitted would defeat the provision of any law. If so the agreement will be void under S.23.

5. Admittedly the land in question belonged to the Government and was assigned to the first defendant. S.3 of the K