The main legal point established in the judgment is that the intention of the parties, as expressed in the settlement document, is crucial in determining the nature of the rights obtained by the parties, and that restrictive clauses may be deemed inoperative if they offend public policy.

M.P. MENON, J. :- The short but interesting question in these two appeals is about the construction of Ext.A2 settlement.

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2. One Walter Rose died on 24-6-1969 leaving behind his widow Mabel, two sons Suresh and Mahesh, and two daughters Hasheela and Jamila. Under the Travancore Christian Succession Act all the. five were entitled to shares in the properties of the deceased, with the difference that the share of the widow would be limited to a life interest, the remainder devolving on the others on her death. Instead of effecting a partition on the above lines, however, Mabel and her children entered into Ext.A2 agreement on 1-9-1969 settling the properties in a different manner. Mabel was not interested in getting her share; the properties were therefore divided into four equal shares, scheduled as A, B, C and D. The Items in B, C and D schedules were set apart absolutely to Mahesh, Hasheela and Jamila respectively. A-schedule allotted to the eldest son Suresh consisted of two items. The first (13 cents) was to be retained by Mabel, with a right to take its income, till the marriage of the youngest daughter Jamila; and after her marriage, Suresh was to step into his mother's shoes with a right to enjoy it during his life-time. The second item (7 cents with a building) was also to be retained by the mother during her lifetime, Suresh getting it only after her death, with a right to take income during his lifetime. He could not encumber or alienate items (1) and (2) at any time, and after his death, they were to devolve successively on his descendants.*[ * * *]

* (The Matter in Vernacular Omitted - Ed.)

3. However, between 1972 and 1975, Mabel and Suresh executed a series of documents, including release-deeds, purporting to transfer all their rights in item (2) of the A-schedule in favour of Mahesh. And Mahesh sold those rights to one Saraswathi Amma. Sujit, son of Suresh, thereupon instituted O.S.No.182 of 1975 challenging the validity of the assignments made by his father and grandmother. Disputes arose between him and Saraswathi Amma who, in turn, instituted O.S.No.184 of 1975 for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The Court below dismissed O.S.No.182 of 1975 and decreed O.S.No.184 of 1975. That is how the two appeals have arisen.

4. Mr. Sukumaran Nair for the appellants contends that Mabel and/or Suresh had obtained only a limited interest in the property under Ext.A2 deed i.e. an interest restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally, and that such an interest was not transferable at all, in view of S.6(d) of the T.P.Act. Mr. T.R.G. Warrier for the respondents disputes this position and asserts, in line with the view taken by the Court below, that Suresh had obtained absolute rights in the item under Ext.A2 deed, and that the clause restraining alienation was void. The result therefore turns on the construction of Ext.A2, and it is common ground that if the view taken by the Court below is found to be right, the appeals have to fail.

5. Now. the parties to Ext.2 were Mabel, Suresh, Mahesh, Hasheela and Jamila in that order. The preamble recited that all the parties were in favour of putting an end to "joint rights" and becoming separate, and that the agreement was intended to give effect to this common intention*. The first operative clause provided that as the widow was not desirous of taking a share, the properties would be divided into four and allotted to the four children of Walter Rose as set out in Schedules A to D.*Then followed the restrictive clauses concerning items(1) and (2) of A schedule allotted*to Suresh, a provision that schedules B, C and D could be enjoyed by Mahesh, Hasheela and Jamila with absolute powers of disposition, and a further provision that all the four could obtain separate mutation in their names. Mabel was responsible for payment of tax in respect of item(1) of A-schedule so long as she was in possession; as regards item(2), the liability throughout was that