The decree-holder has the right to make a fresh application for delivery of possession notwithstanding the obstruction in the first instance, and every resistance or obstruction gives a fresh period of limitation from the time of that particular resistance or obstruction.

I do not think that I should order notice in this appeal. According to me, the questions of law the appellants have raised are concluded by definite decisions on the matter. Though there is a view to the contrary taken obiter by a decision of Beaumont, C.J., in the Full Bench case in the Bombay High Court (Mukund Bapu v. Tanu Sakhu, AIR 1933 Bom 457 (FB) ), the majority of the decisions in the matter are agreed on the principles.

2. In execution of a decree for immovable property, the decree-holder-respondent filed an execution petition in the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam. Pursuant to the order of delivery made in those proceedings, the Amin came to the plaint schedule property for effecting delivery on 21-12-1976. The appellants and three others who were not parties to the decree obstructed to their dispossession. The Amin reported the matter to the court.

3. Thereafter, the respondent-decree-holder filed E. A. No. 15 of 1977 praying for removal of obstruction. He did not bring the appellants on the party array in that petition. Of the obstructors who claimed exclusive possession of separate lots of property, two persons alone had been made parties to the E. A. That petition was decided in favour of the decree-holder and delivery was ordered. The matter had been taken up in appeal and pending final adjudication the proceedings in the execution petition had been stayed. After stay in the execution petition was vacated the E. P. was again taken up. There was no fresh application by the decree holder under O.21, R.35, C.P.C. nor was there any application under O.21, R.95, C.P.C. The executing court ordered delivery of the property on 3-1-1980. On that date, when the Amin came to the property the appellants obstructed their dispossession. The Amin thereupon reported the obstruction to the court and returned the warrant. The decree-holder then preferred on 4-1-1980 an application under O.21, R.97 which is numbered as E. A. 13 of 1980 in E. P. 419 of 1975. To that petition the objection raised by the appellants was the bar of limitation under Art.129 of the Limitation Act, on the ground that the petition having been filed after 30 days of the obstruction on 21-12-1976, is barred and not maintainable. The executing court found against the appellants. An appeal was filed before the District Court which was transferred to the Sub-Court, Ernakulam. The learned Sub-Judge also concurred with the view of the executing court. The law on the matter has been well put up by a Division Bench of the Gujrat High Court in Maneklal v. Ochhaval, (AIR 1970 Guj 49).

4. In AIR 1933 Bom 457 (FB) (Mukund Bapu v. Tanu Sakhu) Beaumont. C.J. speaking for the Bench had said (by way of obiter as he himself had pointed out) that it will be open to the party obstructing to show that his obstruction is by the same person and in the same character as the former obstruction in respect of which no proceeding were taken, and if he succeeds in proving that, Article 167 will then be a bar to the decree-holder's application. The mere fact that the application is made in respect of a fresh warrant for possession, does not, in his view, involve that the obstruction is a fresh obstruction.

5. Article 167 in the Limitation Act of 1908 corresponds to Art.129 of Limitation Act of 1963. In expressing these on the above terms Beaumont, C.J. was dissenting from the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Narain Das v. Hazari Lal, (1896) ILR 18 All 233, where it had been held that even if the first obstruction was made by the same person in the same character as the second obstruction, in respect of the application under O.21, R.97 complaining of the second obstruction, the time would begin to run from the date of the second obstruction and not from the date of the first obstructions. This view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case referred to above had also been taken in Official Trustee v. Monmothonath. (AIR 1953 Cal 499), P.N. Pathak Sharma v. Renuka Debi, (AI