The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal possession in the context of adverse possession by a mortgagee against the mortgagor, and the allowance for the appellant to raise the claim for fixity of tenure at the stage of the final decree.

GOPALAN NAMBIYAR, Ag. C. J.:-This appeal is with the leave of a learned Judge of this Court in S.A. No. 672 of 1971. The matter arises out of a suit for redemption of about 19 cents of land. The 2nd defendant in the suit is the appellant before us. Ext. P-1 dated 23-6-1102 M.E. 5-2-1927 is the mortgage, styled 'Otti Kuzhikanam, sought to be redeemed. It was granted by one Kunjulekshmi Amma, the mother of the minor plaintiff, to the defendants. By Ext. D-3 dated 20-9-1111 = 2-5-1936 a melotti was granted for and on behalf of the plaintiff by the plaintiff's uncle to the 2nd defendant. This was followed by a sale deed Ext. D-2 dated 2-1-1112 = 17-8-1936 by the same uncle to the 2nd defendant. The mortgage Ext. D-1 was released to the 2nd defendant by Ext. D-7 dated 26-10-1112 = 9-6-1947. The plaintiff attained majority on 24-10-1950, and the suit was laid on 29-9-1965 ignoring Ext. D-3. The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed the said judgment and decree and directed that the plaintiff's suit be dismissed. On Second Appeal, a learned Judge of this Court set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and restored that of the trial court.

2. Counsel for the appellant urged two main contentions. First, that the defendants had prescribed title against the plaintiff by adverse possession and limitation; and second, that in any event, the appellant was entitled to plead tenancy rights under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act I of 1964) and to claim fixity of tenure under the provisions of the said Act. On the first question of adverse possession and limitation, it was argued that ever since Ext. D-7 release deed of 1947, the second defendant had remained in possession as absolute owner, and as the same had continued for over 12 years, the rights of the plaintiff had been barred and extinguished. It was stressed that subsequent to Ext. D-7, patta had been transferred in the name of the second defendant as evidenced by Ext. D-8, that the property tax receipts had also been obtained in his name (vide Ext. D-9), and that in land acquisition proceedings relating to a portion of the property (nearly six or seven cents in extent) the compensation amount had been claimed by, and paid to, the second defendant, and no portion of it had been paid to the plaintiff. These are the acts alleged and relied upon to constitute adverse possession and acquisition of title by the plaintiff.

It is unnecessary for us to survey exhaustively the circumstances under which there can be adverse possession by a mortgagee against the mortgagor. This was done by a Full Bench of this Court in Kochappi Kunji v. Damodaran (1970 Ker LT 610) : (AIR 1971 Ker 38 (FB) ). One of us (myself) delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench referred to the various decisions dealing with this aspect of the matter. It was ruled that property subject to a possessory mortgage comprised two distinct subjects capable of independent possession, namely, the intangible or incorporeal equity of redemption and the tangible or corporeal property itself, capable of corporeal possession. While possession of the corporeal property is with the mortgagee, possession of the incorporeal equity of redemption remains with the mortgagor. If the mortgagor releases the equity of redemption in favour of the mortgagee he thereby makes over his incorporeal possession of the equity of redemption to the mortgagee.

Thereafter, the mortgagee is in actual possession of both the corporeal property and the incorporeal equity of redemption, and where the release falls short of this, possession of the corporeal property, whether by the mortgagee or by a trespasser, is not possession of the equity of redemption even if it is accompanied by assertion of full title to the property to the knowledge of the mortgagor. It is only possession of the corporeal property and no more. But where the incorporeal possession of the equity of redemption is accompan