1963 Supreme(Ker) 229
Kerala High Court
S.VELU PILLAI
Lukka Varghese - Appellant
Versus
Devasia Varkey - Respondent
Decided On : 09/24/1963
Joseph Vithayathil, George Vadakkel, M. A. Joseph and Varghese Kalliath, for Appellant; C. J. Antony, for Respondent.
The main legal point established in the judgment is that the execution of a decree under Order XXI Rule 46-B, through garnishee proceedings, is not considered a proceeding against the company under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956.
Headnote:
Order XXI Rule 46-B - Execution of Decree - Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 - [Garnishee Proceedings] - [Order XXI Rule 46-A, Order XXI Rule 46-B, Section 446 Sub-Section (1) of the Companies Act, 1956] - The court discussed the applicability of Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 to the execution of a decree under Order XXI Rule 46-B. It interpreted the provisions of garnishee proceedings and their implications on the execution of the decree, emphasizing that the proceedings against the garnishee were not proceedings against the company and therefore not within the prohibition of Section 446. The court also referred to English law and previous case law to support its interpretation.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a judgment-creditor, attached a debt due to the judgment-debtor from the respondent, a bank. The respondent applied for stay of proceedings under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, after the bank was ordered to be wound up. The lower courts allowed the application, staying the proceedings.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the execution of the decree under Order XXI Rule 46-B was not a proceeding against the company and therefore not within the prohibition of Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. It set aside the lower courts' orders and allowed the appellant to proceed against the respondent according to law.
Issues: The key issue was whether the execution of the decree could be considered a proceeding against the company under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, and whether the appellant was entitled to execute the order as a decree against the respondent.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the proceedings against the garnishee were not proceedings against the company and therefore not within the prohibition of Section 446. It emphasized the applicability of Order XXI Rule 46-B and the distinction between an order absolute and an order nisi in garnishee proceedings.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appellant to proceed against the respondent according to law, setting aside the lower courts' orders and allowing the execution of the decree.
2. Section 446 Sub-Section (1) has enacted :
"When a winding up order has been made or the Official Liquidator has been appointed as provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of the winding up order, shall be proceeded with against the company, except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose."
The question for decision is whether, when the final order under Order XXI, Rule 46-B was passed before the winding up proceedings commenced, the execution of that order can be considered to be a proceeding against the company so as to be within the ban imposed by Section 446. Order XXI Rule 46-A of the Travancore-Cochin Civil Procedure Code, which was in force at the material time provided for an order nisi by the issue of notice to the garnishee calling upon him to pay the debt due from him to the judgment-debtor or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree or to appear and show cause; why he should not do so. Order XXI, Rule 46-B provided for the order nisi being made absolute. It is useful to quote this Rule :
"Where the garnishee does not forthwith or within such time as the Court may allow, pay or deliver into Court the amount due from or the property deliverable by him to the judgment-debtor or so much thereof as is sufficient to satisfy the decree and the costs of execution, or does not appear and show cause in answer to the notice, the Court may order the garnishee to comply with the terms of such notice, and on such order being made, execution may issue as though such order were a decree against him."
The concluding part of the Rule is what is important. The final order is to be deemed to be a decree against the garnishee and necessarily in favour of the judgment-creditor, if so, it is logical to hold that the further proceedings are in execution of that decree and against the garnishee. But for this special procedure, the time-honoured method of proceeding against the attached debt by sale, and of realisation thereof by suit, would have to be resorted to. Such a proceeding by way of suit is against the garnishee; this is avoided by the short-cut invented by Order XXI, Rule 46-B. I see great force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the proceedings which are now stayed by the court below, were not proceedings against the bank but were against the respondent. It seems to me to be of no relevance, that this proceeding had a nexus with the decree against the judgment-debtor and later with the attachment.
3. In English Law, where the garnishee does not appear and contest his liability, the order nisi may be made absolute, and execution may be levied against him. The effect of an order absolute is stated thus, in 16 Halsbury's Laws of England, third edition page 90, paragraph 136 :
"Upon the order being made absolute, the garnishee becomes liable to pay to the judgment creditor th