These writ petitions raise certain issues under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

2. Sub Court, Payyannaur decided LAR 120 of 1987 on 20.3.1990. At the instance of the claimant, this court set aside that award in L.A.A.No.220 of 1992 and remitted that matter for reconsideration, giving the claimants opportunity to amend their pleadings. After the remit, the Sub Court passed an award on 3.9.1997.

3. Based on the aforesaid award dated 3.9.1997, hereinafter, the "post-remit award", for short, the petitioner in WP(C)25626 of 2009 filed an application invoking Section 28A(1) of the Act. That request was turned down holding that the application was not filed within a period of three months from the date on which the Sub Court issued the award dated 20.3.1990, that is, the award before the appeal to this court.

4. The petitioner in WP(C) 24875 of 2009 filed an application under Section 28A(1) on the basis of the award in LAR 150 of 1987. Thereafter, it appeared to the petitioner that the said application would be time barred. Therefore, another application under Section 28A(1) was filed based on the aforesaid post-remit award in LAR 120 of 1987. The first application based on the award in LAR 150 of 1987 was rejected as time barred. Later, the application based on the post-remit award in LAR 120 of 1987 was rejected stating that it is barred in view of the rejection of the earlier application.

5. If I were to go solely by the ground on which the application of the petitioner in WP(C) 24875 of 2009 is rejected, it has to be straight away answered by stating that the order is wrong, in as much as a rejection of an earlier application on ground of delay referable to the award relied on in that application is no ground for rejecting a later application dependent on a different award. All that has to be ensured is that an application has to be within a period of three months in terms of the proviso to Section 28A(1) based on the award that is relied on for the purpose of that application. This is the settled law.

6. But, a larger question arises for decision in these two writ petitions. It directly arises in WP(C)25626 of 2009, emanating from the decision impugned therein. In so far as WP (C) 24875 of 2009 is concerned, it arises in the form of defence by the respondents, as projected by the learned Government Pleader.

7. The issue that falls for decision arises this way: As already noticed, LAR 120 of 1987 was decided by the reference court on 20.3.1990. That award was set aside by this court and matter remitted. The reference court again decided the case on 3.9.1997. I have called that award as the post-remit award. On these facts, the questions raised are; (1) Whether a post-remit award could be the basis of an application under Section 28A(1)? (2) Whether such an application under Section 28A(1) would stand only if it had been filed within a period of three months from the date of the award that was initially passed by the reference court, which award was set aside in appeal, leading to the post-remit award?

8. If the application under Section 28A(1) ought to have been filed from the date on which the reference court passed the award for the first time in LAR 120 of 1987, that is before the order of remit in LAA No.220 of 1992, all the applications which have led to these writ petitions are time barred since that award was passed on 20.3.1990.

9. Adv. O Ramachandran Nambiar and Adv. Sergi Joseph Thomas, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in these matters, argued that the period of limitation for the purpose of proviso to Section 28A(1) has to be decided on the basis of the award which is made the foundation of the application and cannot be determined on the basis of any other award. Dilating further, Adv.Nambiar further argued that the cause of action for filing an application under Section 28A(1) is the factum of a person being aggrieved in terms of Section 28A (1) and this would arise only when an award is pa