1. The Privy Council observed in General Manager of Raj Durbhanga v. Ramput Singh (14 Moor's Indian Appeals 605 age page 612):

"Difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a decree".

B.N. Banerjee J., observed in Sm.Anita Karmokar and Another v. Birendra Chandra Karmokar (AIR 1962 Calcutta 88):

"The path of execution is not an easy going high way and provides no short-cuts to the destination."

2. As it happens usually in the present case also, may be without much difficulty respondent secured a decree against petitioner on 29.06.1994 for recovery of money. Certain items of immovable properties belonging to the petitioner were placed under attachment before judgment. To execute that decree respondent filed E.P.No.34 of 2002 within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, "the Act") and proceeded against some of the properties attached but the execution did not prove successful. On 11.07.2008 respondent filed Ext.P1, proclamation schedule to proceed against an item of property referred to therein and which also was placed under attachment before judgment but not included in E.P.No.34 of 2002. Petitioner preferred objection to Ex.P1, contending that proclamation (dated 10.07.2008) has been filed on 11.07.2008 after the period of limitation prescribed for execution of a decree under Article 136 of the Act expired on 29.06.2006, Ext.P1, proclamation schedule should be treated as execution against the property mentioned therein filed beyond the prescribed time and hence barred by limitation. Petitioner filed Ext.P2, application (EA No.354 of 2009) challenging maintainability of Ext.P1, proclamation schedule. That application was dismissed by the executing court as per Ext.P3, order which is under challenge in this Writ Petition. 3. The following question arises for a decision in this Writ Petition:

"Whether an item of property (though placed under attachment before judgment) can be proceeded against in execution of a decree for recovery of money after the period of limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Act though the execution petition was filed within the period of limitation?"

4. It is contended by learned counsel for petitioner that though E.P.No.34 of 2002 was filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Act, Ext.P1, proclamation schedule was filed on 11.07.209 with intend to proceed against a new item of property not mentioned in the execution petition and hence it is an execution against the new item of property which cannot be permitted after period of limitation computed from the date of decree (29.06.1994). Learned counsel contends that when the decree holder seeks to proceed against an item of immovable property in execution it is in effect execution against that item of property and hence Ext.P1, proclamation must be treated as an application for execution against the property mentioned therein. Learned counsel contends that though Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, "the Code") was repealed by Sec.28 of the Act, the rigour of that provision and the period of limitation for execution of a decree continued to be in force in view of Article 136 of the Act. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in Pentapati China Venkanna v. Pentapati Bengararaju and Others (AIR 1964 SC 1454), Lalji Raja & Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram (AIR 1971 SC 974), Anandilal v. Ram Narain (AIR 1984 SC 1383), Rajammal v. State Bank of Mysore (1992 (2) KLT 321) and Chandi Prasad v. Jagadish Prasad ([2004] 8 SCC 724). In response it is contended by learned counsel for respondent that property mentioned in Ext.P1, proclamation schedule was placed under attachment before judgment. By virtue of Order XXXVIII Rule 11 of the Code attachment before judgment continues to be in force even after passing the decree and hence property mentioned in Ext.P1, proclamation schedule should be treated as attached in exec