CR

Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. By virtue of Section 31(i) thereof, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, for short, the 'Act', does not apply to any security interest created in agricultural land. The issue raised in this writ appeal is as to whether such exemption applies to lands on which rubber plants/trees are grown. Views in the impugned judgment:

2. Learned single Judge noted that the term 'agricultural land' is not defined in the Act. Therefore, it was taken that the term had to be read and understood as in common parlance. With that, the decision in State of Kerala v. Lucy Kochuvareed [1987(1) KLT 578] was distinguished and it was held that considering the scope and ambit of the relevant provisions of the law and also the scheme of the statute, it can only be read and understood as not including rubber plantation even by the farthest stretch of imagination. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed. Hence this appeal by the writ petitioner.

3. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents.

Contentions and arguments of the appellant:

4. The appellant-writ petitioner contended that the respondents did not have jurisdiction to initiate the impugned proceedings under the Act in as much as such action is taken in relation to security interest created in agricultural land; the land in question being a rubber plantation, duly certified and supported by the Rubber Board through various schemes. These contentions are reiterated before us. Ext.P1 is the rubber cultivation development permit issued by the Rubber Board on 19.7.1996 issued cancelling an earlier permit issued on 31.3.1992. The expenditure and subsidy support are evidenced by Ext.P1, which also reveals that the first two instalments of subsidy were paid to the previous owner. Ext.P6 is the document as per which the petitioner obtained the property. Contentions and arguments of the respondents:

5. The respondents contended that the basic document relating to the property in question would show that the land was originally a barren one and that at the most, it can be treated as a rubber plantation which is not an agricultural land falling under Section 31(i) of the Act. It is contended that it is not the scheme of the Act to exclude its application in respect of plantations like rubber, coffee, tea etc. The plea is that the term 'agricultural land' in Section 31(i) of the Act means only such lands, on which agricultural operations are being carried on for the purpose of livelihood, whereas plantations with large extent of property is, essentially, commercial activity, not intended to be excluded from the purview of the Act. It is pleaded that the different items specified in Section 31 predominantly show that properties of commercial importance are not intended to be exempted and the exemption applies only to small items, recovery of which may affect livelihood. The respondents accordingly contend that the property of the petitioner, which is a rubber plantation, is not eligible to be excluded from the purview of the Act. Respondents reiterated these contentions before us. Consideration of the appeal:

6. It is not disputed before us that the land in question stands planted with rubber plants/trees and is a rubber plantation duly certified as such, by the Rubber Board. In fact, the pleadings of the respondents stand to admit this position. Therefore, there is no disputed question of fact as to the identity of the property or the nature and utility to which it is put to.

7. The only issue for decision is as to whether a piece of land planted with rubber is to be excluded from the term 'agricultural land' for the purpose of Section 31(i) of the Act.

8. Section 31(i) of the Act reads as follows:

31. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases.-

The provisions of this Act shall not apply to -

(i) any security interest created in agricultural